ETHA 10-K & 10-Q changes, risk factors and insider trading

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ether, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including ether, over the course of 2021, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for ether. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout ether’s history, including in 2021-2025. For example, ether lost approximately 12.2% of its value according to some sources in 2021-2023.mid-October 2025 as part of wider digital asset market turmoil, widely attributed to global trade tensions, which triggered a number of dislocations in the digital asset market (the “October 2025 Flash Crash”), including liquidations of up to $20 billion in collateral in the form of various digital assets (including, but not limited to, ether) securing trades (particularly perpetual futures contracts and various forms of financing transactions), along with reported service interruptions, halted orders, forced unwinding of trades, and other issues, across centralized and decentralized exchanges. As of the date of this report, digital asset prices have continued to fluctuate in 2024.2026.

Extreme volatility may persist, and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may still be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, the prices of digital asset prices,assets, including ether, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny has increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities. These events are continuing to develop, and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.

The priceprices of some digital assets, including ether, hashave risenfluctuated significantly following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Some expect the new administration to adopt a constructive attitude toward the digital assetsasset industry. Through his executive orders, President Trump has indicated that the administration will work toward providing greater regulatory clarity and certainty for emerging technologies, including blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development. Similarly, the digital assetsasset industry expects favorable legislation from the new U.S. Congress as certain members have expressed interest in advancing digital asset specific legislation. To the extent market expectations about future activity by the administration or Congress lead digital asset prices and valuations to increase, there can be no assurance such expectations will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to the digital asset market post-President Trump’s election as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide greater regulatory clarity and certainty for blockchain technology and digital assets, such as through promulgating a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets that meets industry expectations, could lead to a decline in the prices of digital assets prices,assets, including ether. Such a decline could cause a declinesreduction in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not shift over time.

Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ether, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actionsaction to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ether.

The value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of ether as a digital asset, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, destruction, or compromise of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset, and the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies such as the Ethereum blockchain.

The governance of decentralized networks, such as the Ethereum network, is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of any particular decentralized digital asset network, which may stymie such network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. The foregoing notwithstanding, the protocols for some decentralized networks, such as the Ethereum network, are informally managed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s source code. Core developers’ roles evolve over time, largely based on self determinedself-determined participation. If a significant majority of nodes, users and validators adopt amendments to a decentralized network based on the proposals of such core developers, such network will be subject to new protocols that may adversely affect the value of the relevant digital asset.

The Ethereum network uses cryptographic protocols to govern the interactions within the Ethereum network. A loose community known as the core developers has evolved to informally manage the source code for the protocol. Membership in the community of core developers evolveevolves over time, largely based on self-determined participation in the resource section dedicated to Ethereum on Github.com. The core developers can propose amendments to the Ethereum network’s source code that, if accepted by nodes, validators and users, could alter the protocols and software of the Ethereum network and the properties of ether. These alterations would occur through software upgrades, and could potentially include changes to the irreversibility of transactions and limitations on the issuance of new ether or changes to the ether supply, which could undermine the appeal and market value of ether. Alternatively, software upgrades and other changes to the protocols of the Ethereum network could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects or flaws, security risks, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. As a result, the Ethereum network could be subject to changes to its protocols and software in the future that may adversely affect an investment in the Trust.

The Ethereum network operates based on an open-source protocol maintained by the core developers and other contributors, largely on the GitHub resource section dedicated to Ethereum network development. As new ether are rewarded solely for validator activity (other than the 2014 pre-mine) and are not sold on an ongoing basis to generate revenue to support development activity, and the Ethereum network protocol itself is made available for free rather than sold or made available subject to licensing or subscription fees and its use does not generate revenues for its development team, the core developers are generally not compensated for maintaining and updating the source code for the Ethereum network protocol. Consequently, there is a lack of financial incentive for developers to maintain or develop the Ethereum network and the core developers may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues with the Ethereum network protocol. Although the Ethereum network is currently supported by the core developers, there can be no guarantee that such support will continue or be sufficient in the future. For example, there have been recent reports that the number of core developers who have the authority to make amendments to the Ethereum network’s source code in the GitHub repository is relatively small, although there are believed to be a larger number of developers who contribute to the overall development of the source code of the Ethereum network. TheAnother perceptionexample of Ethereum’s open-source dependencies is that high-profileShipyard, contributorsone mayof nothe longerkey contributemaintainers of libp2p – the peer-to-peer networking stack under Ethereum–ceased support for Go and JavaScript by September 30, 2025. Libp2p is important for the efficient operation of the Ethereum network, particularly in broadcasting new blocks and validator votes, which illustrates Ethereum’s open‑source dependencies. A failure to themaintain networkor may have an adverse effect onevolve the marketnetwork’s priceopen-source ofcomponents anycould relatedmaterially digitalimpair assets.the ForEthereum example,network’s functionality and, in Juneturn, 2017,adversely an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum core developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor,impact the price of ether decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of ether. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Ethereum network, such as Vitalik Buterin, is perceived as no longer able to contribute to the Ethereum network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ether, which could adversely impact theand value of the Shares.

Many digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public blockchains generally face ata tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which public blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single validator on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and every single full node is responsible for maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the fact that all validators participate in validating in each block and the capabilities of each single fully participating node.

As of December 31, 2024,2025, the Ethereum network handled approximately 12-1525 transactions per second (according to DuneCoin analyticsMetrics). In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Ethereum network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. In December 2017, the popularity of the blockchain-based game CryptoKittiesCryptokitties led to significant network congestion on the Ethereum network. The game, which allows players to trade and create virtual kitties, represented by non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”), was reported by some sources to have accounted for more than 10% of the entire Ethereum network traffic at the time causing increases in transaction fees and delays in transaction processing times, and driving Ethereum network traffic to a reported then-all timethen-all-time high. Since January 1, 2020, ether transaction fees have increased from $0.08 average daily transaction fees per ether transaction, to a high of up to approximately $200.06 average daily transaction fees per transaction on May 1, 2022. As of December 31, 2024,2025, ether transaction fees stood at $3.52$0.15 per transaction, on average.average (according to Coin Metrics). Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ether (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ether, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

In the second half of 2020, the Ethereum network began the first of several stages of an upgrade culminating in the Merge. The Merge amended the Ethereum network’s consensus mechanism to a process known as proof-of-stake,proof‑of‑stake, and was intended to address the perceived shortcomings of the proof-of proof‑of‑work consensus mechanism in terms of labor intensity and duplicative computational effort expended by validators (known under proof-of-workproof‑of‑work as “miners”) who did not win the race, under proof of work,proof-of-work, to be the first in time to solve the cryptographic puzzle that would allow them to be the only valid at orvalidator permitted to validate the block and receive the resulting block reward (which was only given to the first validator to successfully solve the puzzle and hash a given block, and not to others). Instead, under proof-of-stake, a single validator is randomly selected to solve the cryptographic puzzle needed to validate a block, which it proposes to a committee of other validators, who vote for whether to include the block (or not), which reduces the computational work performed – and energy expended – to validate each block compared to proof-of-work.

Following the Merge, core development of the Ethereum source code has increasingly focused on modifications of the Ethereum protocol to increase speed, throughput and scalability and alsoto improve existing or next generationnext-generation uses. Future upgrades to the Ethereum protocol and Ethereum blockchain to address scaling issues – such as network congestion, slow throughput and periods of high transaction fees owing to spikes in network demand – have been discussed by network participants, such as sharding. The purpose of sharding is to increase scalability of the Ethereum blockchain by splitting the blockchain into subsections, called shards, and dividing validation responsibility so that a defined subset of validators would be responsible for each shard, rather than all validators being responsible for the entire blockchain, allowing for parallel processing and validation of transactions. However, there appears to be uncertainty and a lack of existing widespread consensus among network participants about how to solve the scaling challenges faced by the Ethereum network.

The rapid development of other competing scalability solutions, such as those which would rely on handling the bulk of computational work relating to transactions or smart contracts and applications built on the Ethereum network (consistent with common usage, all such applications are referred to as “ decentralized applications” or “dApps”, whether or not decentralized in fact) outside of the main Ethereum network and Ethereum blockchain, has caused alternatives to sharding to emerge. “Layer 2” is a collective term for solutions which are designed to help increase throughput and reduce transaction fees by handling or validating transactions off the main Ethereum network (known as “Layer 1”) and then attempting to take advantage of the perceived security and integrity advantages of the Layer 1 Ethereum network by uploading the transactions validated on the Layer 2 protocol back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. The details of how this is done vary significantly between different Layer 2 technologies and implementations. For example, “rollups” perform transaction execution outside the Layer 1 Ethereum network and then post the data, typically in batches, back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network where consensus is reached. “Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not all of the entire transactions themselves) that is recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. By contrast, “optimistic rollups” assume transactions are valid by default and only run computation, via a fraud proof, in the event of a challenge. Other proposed Layer 2 scaling solutions include, among others, “state channels”, which are designed to allow participants to run a large number of transactions on the Layer 2 side channel protocol and only submit two transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network (the transaction opening the state channel, and the transaction closing the channel), “side chains”, in which an entire Layer 2 blockchain network with similar capabilities to the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network runs in parallel with the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network and allows smart contracts and dApps to run on the Layer 2 side chain without burdening the main Layer 1 network, and others. To date, the Ethereum network community has not coalesced overwhelmingly around any particular Layer 2 solution, though this could change.

There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the speed and throughput of settlement of Ethereum network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could cause the Ethereum network to not adequately resolve scaling challenges and adversely impact the adoption of ether and the Ethereum network and the value of the Shares. There is no guarantee that any potential scaling solution, whether a change to the Layer 1 Ethereum network like sharding or the introduction of a Layer 2 solution like rollups, state channels or side chains, will achieve widespread adoption. Alternatively, in theory, the widespread adoption of Layer 2 solutions could succeed in reducing congestion on the Layer 1 Ethereum network by moving transactions and computational work to the Layer 2 level and thereby reducing direct transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, but by reducing transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, could reduce demand for ether on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which could in theory negatively impact the price of ether. It is possible that proposed changes to the Layer 1 Ethereum network could divide the community, potentially even causing a hard fork, or that the decentralized governance of the Ethereum network causes network participants to fail to coalesce overwhelmingly around any particular solution, causing the Ethereum network to suffer reduced adoption or causing nodes, users or validators to migrate to other blockchain networks. It is also possible that scaling solutions could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects or flaws, security risks, or other problems that could cause them to suffer operational disruptions. For example, in April 2024, Starknet, a Layer 2 built on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, suffered an outage reportedly caused by a rounding error bug that halted production of new blocks on Starknet’s Layer 2 blockchain network. Similar outages, bugs, defects, or other problems could affect Layer 2s in the future. Similarly, in multiple instances throughout 2022 and 2023, the Arbitrum Layer 2 network experienced outages due to failures in its primary node responsible for submitting transactions to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Although the Layer 1 Ethereum network is believed not to have been affected by those outages, problems on Layer 2s in the future could conceivably affect or cause issues for the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Alternatively, if a widely used Layer 2 network were to fail, it could reduce demand for ether because it would eliminate a source of demand for using ether to record transactions from the Layer 2 onto the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect the price of ether or the value of the Shares.

If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority (over 50%) of the validating power on the Ethereum network, it may be able to alter the Ethereum blockchain on which transactions in ether rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet would not be able to generate new tokens or transactions using such control, it could “double-spend” its own tokens (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control (over 50%). To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the Ethereum network or the Ethereum community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Ethereum blockchain may not be possible. If the malicious actor were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked ether on the Ethereum network, theyit could temporarily impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a temporary fork in the blockchain, but it is not believed that theyit could engage in double-spending or fraudulent block propagation. Even without 33% control, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Ethereum network (similar to a denial-of-service attack).

In addition,Additionally, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur maycould have negatively impactimpacted perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the proof-of-stake Ethereum network, which could negatively impact the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

Validators must deposit 32 ether to activate a unique validator key pair that is used to sign block proposals and attestations on behalf of its stake (i.e., vote on its view of the chain). For every 32 ether deposits staked, a unique validator key pair is generated. An application built on the Ethereum network, or a single node operator, can manage many validator key pairs. For example, Lido, an application that provides a so-called “liquid staking” solution which permits holders of ether to deposit them with Lido, which stakes the ether while issuing the holder a transferrable token, is reported by some sources to have or have had up to 275,000 validator key pairs (each representing 32 staked ether) divided across over 30 node operators. At times, Lido has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the total staked ether on the Ethereum network. While it is widely believed that Lido has little incentive to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations using its reported 33% stake, since doing so would likely cause its entire stake to be slashed and thus lost (assuming good actors unaffiliated with Lido controlled the remainder), and also because Lido is believed to not control most of the third party node operators where its ether is staked, and finally sincebecause the occurrence of such manipulation of the Ethereum network’s consensus process by Lido or any other actor would likely cause ether to lose substantial value (which would obviously hurt Lido economically), it nevertheless poses centralization concerns. If Lido, or a bad actor with a similar sized stake, were to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations, it could negatively affect the use and adoption of the Ethereum network, the value of ether, and thus the value of the Shares.

The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, cancould lead to forks (referred to as “planned forksˮ because they take place through a formal process).

In the case of planned forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code called EIPs.(“EIPs”). Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source code for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, and ultimately a critical mass of validators and users – such as dApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of dApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum blockchain or Ethereum network – must support the shift, or the upgrades will lack adoption.

TypicallyTypically, in the case of a planned fork, once the EIPs are formally introduced by being merged into the EIP repository on GitHub, a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change ordinarily follows. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. A modification of the Ethereum network’s source code is only effective with respect to the Ethereum nodes that download it and modify their Ethereum Clients accordingly, and in practice such decisions are heavily influenced by the preferences of validators and users. Typically, after a modification is introduced and if a sufficiently broad critical mass of users and validators support the modification and nodes download the modification into their individual Ethereum Clients, the change is implemented and the Ethereum network continues to operate uninterrupted, assuming there are no software issues (e.g., bugs, outages, etc.). However, if less than a sufficiently broad critical mass (in practice, amounting to a substantial majority) of users and validators support the proposed modification and nodes refuse to download the modification to their Ethereum Clients, and the modification is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum blockchain or network or the Ethereum Clients of nodes prior to their modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network, with one group of nodes running the pre-modified software, with users and validators continuing to use the pre-modified software, while the other group would adopt and run the modified software. The effect of such a hard fork would be the existence of two versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel on separate networks using separate blockchain ledgers, yet lacking interchangeability. In practice, in a hard fork, the two networks would compete with each other for developers, node operators, users, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants,participants and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed 50% of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack.

A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. A fork could also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Alternatively, as with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. If a fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork.valuable. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares.

On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, making them more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as wellwell, due,due in part,part to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.

As illustrated by Dencun andDencun, the Merge, and Fusaka, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium substage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain main net for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain test net following the Merge). On May 7, 2025, “Pectra” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, went live. Pectra, among other changes, increased the maximum amount of ether that a validator can stake from 32 to 2,048, allowing validators to manage higher balances with the goals of potentially reducing costs; introducing account abstraction, allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to temporarily function like smart contracts; and reducing security risks and shortenening the wait time for new validators. Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, or create problematic economic incentives which incentivizecould increase behavior whichthat has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Forks may also occur as a digital asset network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum underwent a hard fork between the Layer 1 Ethereum network and a new digital asset running on a “forked” branch of the network, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach. In June 2016, an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ether held by The DAO, a distributeddecentralized autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, and after a contentious debate, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a hard fork that effectively reversed the hack, and this network constitutes the Layer 1 Ethereum network. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic”, which is not backwards compatible with the Layer 1 Ethereum network and is considered a forked branch, with the native digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. Following the July 2016 hard fork between the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, new security concerns surfaced. Replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum exchanges through at least October 2016. An Ethereum exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018, and security concerns could similarly surface in connection with future hard forks.

An unplanned fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of Ethereum Client software that nodes run and use to access the Ethereum network. For example, such an unplanned fork reportedly occurred in the Go-Ethereum (“Geth”) client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network and whose developers are financially supported by the Ethereum Foundation. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time, such as Besu, Open Ethereum, and Nethermind), and a patch was released that all nodes using the Geth client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all nodes using Geth did so, resulting within the non-patched Geth nodes temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum blockchain than the patched Geth nodes and nodes using other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum blockchain, causing the nodes using the non-patched Geth version to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the nodes on the Ethereum blockchain, interrupting the non-patch Geth nodes’ access to the Ethereum network. For example, Infura, which is a node operator that provides services to major Ethereum smart contracts, wallet software providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, and other market participants, reportedly ran numerous nodes using the Geth client. Infura’s Geth client running nodes reportedly used the outdated, non-patched Geth version initially, which is said to have caused those nodes to be on the minority blockchain, impacting transaction execution, validation, and recording on the main Layer 1 Ethereum network for Infura’s customers – such as Ethereum-basedEthereum‑based smart contracts, wallet providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, etc. – until Infura was able to apply the software update released by the Geth client developers to Infura’s nodes that use Geth as their Ethereum Client. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all nodes using the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth nodes, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network, including for Infura and its customers.

In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to nodes, users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future unplanned fork, a substantial number of nodes, users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, following the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run two Ethereum Clients, i.e., an Execution Client and a Consensus Client paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate effectively with eachthe other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate effectively with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unplanned fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ether to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares.

Protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase,codebase butthat results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. For example, following the DAO hack in July 2016, holders of Ethereum voted on-chain to reverse the hack, effectively causing a hard fork. For the days following the vote, the price of Ethereum rose from $11.65 on July 15, 2016 to $14.66 on July 21, 2016, the day after the first Ethereum Classic block was mined. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZECZEC, the native cryptocurrency of Zcash, fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell offsell-off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016.

We refer to the right to receive any such benefit as an “Incidental Right” and any such digital asset (other than ether) acquired through an Incidental Right as an “IR Digital Asset.” With respect to a fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Digital Asset associated with such event. As such, Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any Incidental Rights andor any IR Digital Asset.

In the event the Trust seeks to change the Trust’s policy with respect to Incidental Rights or IR Digital Asset,Assets, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by NASDAQ seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to sell Incidental Rights or IR Digital AssetAssets and distribute the cash proceeds (net of expenses and applicable withholding taxes) to DTC or distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Digital Asset in-kind to DTC. However, there can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when NASDAQ will seek or obtain this approval, if at all.

In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum network, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Ethereum network, is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on whatever factors it deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of ether, users, services, businesses, validators and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, validating power on, and community engagement with, the Ethereum network, or whatever other factors it deems relevant. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork,valuable, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, the Ether Custodian, other service providers, the Index Administrator, crypto asset platforms, or other market participants on what is generally accepted as ether and should therefore be considered “ether” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result.

From time to time, digital assets may undergo name changes and associated rebranding initiatives. For example, Bitcoin Cash may sometimes be referred to as Bitcoin ABC in an effort to differentiate itself from any Bitcoin Cash hard forks, such as Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision, and in the third quarter of 2018, the team behind ZEN rebranded and changed the name of ZenCash to “Horizen.” The Sponsor cannot predict the impact of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative on ether. After a name change and an associated rebranding initiative, a digital asset may not be able to achieve or maintain brand namebrand-name recognition or status that is comparable to the recognition and status previously enjoyed by such digital asset. The failure of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by aether digital asset maycould result in such digital assetether not realizing some or all of the anticipated benefits contemplated by the name change and associated rebranding initiative, and could negatively impact the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

Smart contracts are programs that run on the Ethereum blockchain that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. SinceBecause smart contracts typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in their programming can have damaging effects. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying The DAO allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ether from The DAO’s accounts into a segregated account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain core developers and contributors pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ether reportedly dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity reportedly led to a reportedly $30 million theft of ether, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software reportedly led to roughly $160 million worth of ether being indefinitely frozen in an account. Furthermore, in April 2018, a batch overflow bug was found in many Ethereum-based ERC20-compatible smart contract tokens that allowsallowed hackers to create a large number of smart contract tokens, causing multiple crypto asset platforms worldwide to shut downshutdown ERC20-compatible token trading. Similarly, in March 2020, a design flaw in the Maker DAO smart contract caused forced liquidations of crypto assets at significantly discounted prices, resulting in millions of dollars of losses to users who had deposited crypto assets into the smart contract. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and DeFi protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Problems with the development, deployment, and operation of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of ether. In some cases, smart contracts can be controlled by one or more “admin keys” or users with special privileges, or “super users.” These users may have the ability to unilaterally make changes to the smart contract, enable or disable features on the smart contract, change how the smart contract receives external inputs and data or transmits ether or other digital assets, andor make other changes to the smart contract. Furthermore, in some cases inadequate public information may be available about certain smart contracts or applications, and information asymmetries may exist, even with respect to open sourceopen-source smart contracts or applications;; certain participants may have hidden informational or technological advantages, making for an uneven playing field. There may be opportunities for bad actors to perpetrate fraudulent schemes and engage in illicit activities and other misconduct, such as exit scams and rug pulls (orchestrated by developers and/or influencers who promote a smart contract or application and, ultimately, escape with the money at an agreed time), or Ponzi or similar fraud schemes. Many DeFi applications are currently deployed on the Ethereum network, and smart contracts relating to DeFi applications currently represent a significant source of demand for ether. DeFi applications may achieve their investment purposes through self-executing smart contracts that may allow users, for example, to invest digital assets in a pool from which other users can borrow without requiring an intermediate party to facilitate these transactions. These investments may earn interest to the investor based on the rates at which borrowers repay the loan, and can generally be withdrawn by the investor. For smart contracts that hold a pool of digital asset reserves, smart contract super users or admin key holders may be able to extract funds from the pool, liquidate assets held in the pool, or take other actions that decrease the value of the digital assets held by the smart contract in reserves. Even for digital assets that have adopted a decentralized governance mechanism, such as smart contracts that are governed by the holders of a governance token, such governance tokens can be concentrated in the hands of a small group of core community members, who would be able to make similar changes unilaterally to the smart contract. If any such super user or group of core members unilaterally make adverse changes to a smart contract, the design, functionality, features and value of the smart contract, its related digital assets may be harmed. In addition, assets held by the smart contract in reserves may be stolen, misused, burnt, locked up or otherwise become unusable and irrecoverable. Super users can also become targets of hackers and malicious attackers. If an attacker is able to access or obtain the super user privileges of a smart contract, or if a smart contract’s super users or core community members take actions that adversely affect the smart contract, users who transact with the smart contract may experience decreased functionality of the smart contract or may suffer a partial or total loss of any digital assets they have used to transact with the smart contract. Furthermore, the underlying smart contracts may be insecure, contain bugs or other vulnerabilities, or otherwise may not work as intended. Any of the foregoing could cause users of the DeFi application to be negatively affected or could cause the DeFi application to be the subject of negative publicity. Because DeFi applications may be built on the Ethereum network and represent a significant source of demand for ether, public confidence in the Ethereum network itself could be negatively affected, such sources of demand could diminish, and the value of ether could decrease. Similar risks apply to any smart contract or decentralized application, not just DeFi applications.

Validation on the Ethereum network requires ether to be transferred into smart contracts on the underlying blockchain networks not under the Trust’s or anyone else’s control. If the Ethereum network source code or protocol fail to behave as expected, suffer cybersecurity attacks or hacks, experience security issues, or encounter other problems, such assets may be irretrievably lost. The Ethereum network imposes three types of sanctions for validator misbehavior or inactivity, which would result in a portion of their staked ether being destroyed or “burned”: penalties, slashing and inactivity leaks. A validator may face penalties if it fails to take certain actions, such as providing a timely attestation to a block proposed by another validator. Under this scenario, a validator’s staked ether could be burned in an amount equal to the reward to which it would have been entitled for performing the actions. A more severe sanction (i.e., “slashing”) is imposed if a validator commits malicious acts related to the proposal or attestation of blocks with invalid transactions. Slashing can result in the validator having a portion of its staked ether immediately confiscated, withdrawn or burned by the network, resulting in losses to them. After this initial slashing, the validator is queued for forceful removal from the Ethereum network’s validator “pool,” and more of the validator’s stake is burned over a period of approximately 36 days with the exact amount of ether burned and time period determined by the network regardless of whether the validator makes any further slashable errors, at which point the validator is automatically removed from the validator pool. Staked ether may also be burned through a process known as an “inactivity leak,” which is triggered if the Ethereum network has gone too long without finalizing a new block. For a new block to be successfully added to the blockchain, validators that account for at least two thirds of all staked ether must agree on the validity of a proposed block. This means that if validators representing more than one third of the total staked ether are offline, no new blocks can be finalized. To prevent this, an inactivity leak causes the ether staked by the inactive validators to gradually “bleed away” until these inactive validators represent less than one-third of the total stake, thereby allowing the remaining active validators to finalize proposed blocks. This provides a further incentive for validators to remain online and continue performing validation activities. Within the post-Merge Ethereum network, as part of the “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking, staked ether will be inaccessible for a variable period of time determined by a range of factors, including network congestion, resulting in potential inaccessibility during those periods. “Activation” is the funding of a validator to be included in the active set, thereby allowing the validator to participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. “Exit” is the request to exit from the active set and no longer participate in the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus protocol. As part of these “activating” and “exiting” processes of staking on the Ethereum network, any staked ether will be inaccessible for a period of time. The duration of activating and exiting periods are dependent on a range of factors, including network conditions. However,In dependingperiods onof low demand, un-staking canmay be completed within hours or several days, while in periods of elevated exit activity the process may take betweenmultiple hours, daysweeks or weekslonger to complete. Furthermore, theThe Ethereum network requires the payment of base fees and the practice of paying tips is common, and such fees can become significant as the amount and complexity of the transaction grows, depending on the degree of network congestion and the price of ether. Any cybersecurity attacks, security issues, hacks, penalties, slashing events, or other problems could damage validators’ willingness to participate in validation, discourage existing and future validators from serving as such, and adversely impact the Ethereum network’s adoption or the price of ether. Any disruption of validation on the Ethereum network could interfere with network operations and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease. The limited liquidity during the “activation” or “exiting” processes could dissuade potential validators from participating, which could interfere with network operations or security and cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to users and application developers than competing blockchain networks, which could cause the price of ether to decrease.

Certain digital assets, such as bitcoin, use a “proof-of-work” consensus algorithm. The genesis block on the bitcoin blockchain was mined in 2009, and Bitcoin’s blockchain has been in operation since then. Many newer blockchains enabling smart contract functionality, including the current Ethereum network following the completion of the Merge in 2022, use a newer consensus algorithm known as “proof-of-stake.proof-of stake.” While their proponents believe that they may have certain advantages, the “proof-of-stake” consensus mechanisms and governance systems underlying many newer blockchain protocols, including the Ethereum network following the Merge, and their associated digital assets – including the ether held by the Trust – have not been tested at scale over as long of a period of time or subject to as widespread use or adoption as, for example, Bitcoin’s proof-of-work consensus mechanism has. This could lead to these blockchains, and their associated digital assets, having undetected vulnerabilities, structural design flaws, suboptimal incentive structures for network participants (e.g., validators), technical disruptions, or a wide variety of other problems, any of which could cause these blockchains not to function as intended, lead to outright failure to function entirely causing a total outage or disruption of network activity, or to suffer other operational problems or reputational damage, leading to a loss of users or adoption or a loss in value of the associated digital assets, including the Trust’s assets. Over the long term, there can be no assurance that the proof-of-stake blockchain on which the Trust’s assets rely will achieve widespread scale or adoption or perform successfully; and any failure to do so could negatively impact the value of the Trust’s assets.

The ether market globally and in the United States is not subject to comparable regulatory guardrails as exist in regulated securities markets. FurtherFurthermore, more,manymany ether trading venues lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of ether on trading venues may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-tradingwash trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset platforms or may not exist at all. The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the digital asset markets generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in a digital asset manipulating the digital asset’s pricing; (3) hacking of the digital asset’s peer-to-peer network, protocols and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the digital asset network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in the digital asset, new sources of demand for the digital asset, etc.) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins” (for more information, see “—Prices of Ether may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and US Dollar Coin (“USDC”)),the, the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at digital asset trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading,wash trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in the digital asset markets and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders.

In addition, over the past several years, some digital asset platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset platforms more stable, larger digital asset platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset platforms and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015,Bitstamp2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoins had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large digital asset platform. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resignedresigned, and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. Around the same time, there were reports that approximately $300-600 million of digital assets were removed from FTX and the full facts remain unknown, including whether such removal was the result of a hack, theft, insider activity, or other improper behavior. On February 21, 2025, Bybit, a centralized platform for exchanging digital assets, announced that more than $1.4 billion in ether had been stolen from its platform. Hackers were able to manipulate Bybit’s transfer process to authorize and complete the illicit transaction. The incident has resulted in renewed concerns over the security of digital asset platforms.

The CF Benchmarks Index was developed by the Index Administrator and has a limited performance history. Although the Index is based on materially the same methodology (except calculation time) as the ETHUSD_RR which was first introduced in May 2018, the Index itself has only been in operation since February 2022. The Index price is a composite CF Benchmarks Index calculated using volume-weighted trading price data from various Constituent Platforms. The Index has only featured its current list of Constituent Platforms since MayMarch 2022.2025. A longer history of actual performance through various economic and market conditions would provide greater and more reliable information for an investor to assess the Index’s performance. The Constituent Platforms chosen by the Index Administrator could also change over time. The Index Administrator may remove or add Constituent Platforms to the CF Benchmarks Index in the future at its discretion. For more information on the inclusion criteria for Constituent Platforms in the CF Benchmarks Index.

Although the Index is intended to accurately capture the market price of ether, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ether on public or private markets not included among the Constituent Platforms, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the Index price. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ether on the various Constituent Platforms, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different Constituent Platforms. Certain exchanges within the list of Constituent Platforms employ a proprietary order book combining a traditional limit order book with automated market maker instructions. As their automated market maker relies on a mathematical formula and does not rely on any external pricing data or third-party source, differences in the bids and asks placed by the automated market maker compared to prices offered by other digital currency trading venues, or other external market data sources, for the same digital assets may emerge. While the Index provides a U.S. dollar-denominated composite CF Benchmarks Index for the price of ether based on, in the case of the CF Benchmarks Index, the volume-weighted price of ether on certain Constituent Platforms, at any given time, the prices on each such Constituent PlatformsPlatform or pricing source may not be equal to the value of an ether as represented by the Index. It is possible that the price of ether on the Constituent Platforms could be materially higher or lower than the Index price. To the extent the Index price differs materially from the actual prices available on a Constituent Platform, or the global market price of ether, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the global market price of ether, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ether. To the extent such prices differ materially from the Index price, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ether, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The price of ether on public digital asset platforms has a very limited history, and during this history, ether prices on the digital asset markets more generally, and on digital asset platforms individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the Index is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual digital asset platforms, the Index price, and the price of ether generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by digital asset platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The CF Benchmarks Index is used to determine the net asset value of the Trust and the NAV. Consequently, losses or costs associated with the CF Benchmarks Index’s errors or other risks described above will generally be borne by the Trust and the Shareholders and neither the Sponsor nor its affiliates or agents make any representations or warranties regarding the foregoing. If the CF Benchmarks Index is not available or the Sponsor in its sole discretion determines the CF Benchmarks Index is unreliable as the Index and therefore determines not to use the CF Benchmarks Index the Trust’s holdings may be fair valued on a temporary basis in accordance with the fair value policies approved by the Trustee. See “Business of the Trust—Net Asset Value.” To the extent the valuation determined in accordance with the policy approved by the Trustee differs materially from the actual market price of ether, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the price of ether, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust and the value of Shares by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the price of ether.

While the Trust does not invest in stablecoins, it may nonetheless be exposed to risks that stablecoins pose for the ether market and other digital asset markets. Stablecoins are digital assets designed to have a stable value over time as compared to typically volatile digital assets and are typically marketed as being pegged to a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a certain value. Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable, their market value may fluctuate. This volatility has in the past apparently impacted the price of ether. Stablecoins are a relatively new phenomenon, and it is impossible to know all of the risks that they could pose to participants in the ether market. In addition, some have argued that some stablecoins, particularly Tether, are improperly issued without sufficient backing in a way that, when the stablecoin is used to pay for bitcoin, could cause artificial rather than genuine demand for bitcoin, artificially inflating the price of bitcoin, and if true, there is no assurance similar dynamics would not be at work in the market for ether. There have been reports that those associated with certain stablecoins may be involved in laundering money. On February 17, 2021, the New York Attorney General entered into an agreement with Tether’s operators, including Bitfinex, requiring them to cease any further trading activity with New York persons and pay $18.5 million in penalties for false and misleading statements made regarding the assets backing Tether. On October 15, 2021, the CFTC announced a settlement with Tether’s operators, Tether Holdings Limited, Tether Operations Limited, Tether Limited, and Tether International Limited, in which they agreed to pay $42.5 million in fines to settle charges that, among others, Tether’s claims that it maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every Tether stablecoin in circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat currency” held by Tether were untrue. Bitfinex also agreed to pay the CFTC a $1.5 million fine to settle charges that Bitfinex offered off-exchange leveraged, margined, or financed transactions involving crypto assets, including ether, with U.S. customers who were not eligible contract participants and accepted funds (including in the form of Tether stablecoins) and orders in connection with such illegal off-exchange transactions, triggering an obligation to register with the CFTC, which the CFTC order asserts it violated. The CFTC previously fined Bitfinex in 2016 on similar charges. In addition, a large amount of Tether is issued as ERC-20ERC‑20 tokens on the Ethereum network. If Tether were to no longer be issued or operating on the Ethereum network, there would be no need to use ether to pay the gas fees needed to record ERC-20ERC‑20 Tether transactions on the Ethereum blockchain, and a substantial source of demand for ether could be eliminated, which could cause the price of ether to decrease, affecting the value of the Shares.

As of December 31, 2024,2025, ether was the second largest digital asset by market capitalization as tracked by CoinMarketCap.com.CoinGecko.com. There are over 10,00017,000 alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap.com,CoinGecko.com, having a total market capitalization of approximately $3.26$3.0 trillion (including the approximately $401$359 billion market capitalization of ether), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned smart contracts platforms rather than open platforms like the Ethereum network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets and smart contract platforms, such as Solana, Avalanche, Tron, BNB Coin, Polkadot, or Cardano, among many others, could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, ether and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares. If other blockchain networks with smart contracts or similar capabilities better meet the needs of users, application developers, and/or validators, whether due to higher performance or otherwise, or prove to be more popular than the Ethereum blockchain for any reason, it could lead to less activity on the Ethereum blockchain and lower demand for ether, causing the price of ether and the value of the Shares to decline.

The Trust is a Delaware statutory trust. The Trust does not have any officers, directors, or employees, and is administered by the SecondThird Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated as of July 3,8, 2024,2025, among the Sponsor, the Trustee and the Delaware Trustee. The Trust issues Shares representing fractional undivided beneficial interests in its net assets. The assets of the Trust consist primarily of Etherether held by a custodian on behalf of the Trust.

Valuation of Ether;; The CF Benchmarks Index

The CF Benchmarks Index is calculated as of 4:00 p.m. ET. The CF Benchmarks Index is designed based on the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks and is a Registered Benchmark under the UK BMR. The Index Administrator is a UK incorporated companycompany, authorized and regulated by the FCA of the UK as a Benchmark AdministratorAdministrator, under the UK BMR.

The Trust is not aware of any trends, demands, conditions or events that are reasonably likely to result in material changes to its liquidity needs. In exchange for a fee, the Sponsor has agreed to assume most of the expenses incurred by the Trust. ForAs a result, the only ordinary expense of the Trust during the period covered by this report was the Sponsor’s fee.Fee. The Trust’s only source of liquidity is its sales of ether.

The 0.96% increase in the NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $25.00 at May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to $25.24 at December 31, 2024 is directly related to the 1.03% increase in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV increased slightly less than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s fees,Fee, which werewas $888,986 for the period, or 0.08% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $1,087,092,372 during the period.

The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 400,000 Shares at May 21, 2024 to 141,480,000 Shares at December 31, 2024, a consequence of 147,280,000 Shares (3,682 Baskets) being created and 6,200,000 Shares(155 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase in the price of ether, which grewrose 1.03% from the Trust’s first ether purchase of $3,299.54 on June 24, 2024 to $3,333.60 at December 31, 2024.

Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the period ended December 31, 2024 was $34,418,803, resulting from an unrealized gain on investment in ether of $27,767,502 and a net realized loss of $22,070 from ether sold to pay expenses and a net realized gain of $7,562,357 from ether sold for the redemption of Shares. Other than the net Sponsor’s feesFee of $888,986, the Trust had no expenses during the period.

Depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may be considered a “security” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. Public, though non-binding, statements made in the past by senior officials at the SEC and endorsed by its previous Chairman in a letter to a member of Congress appeared to indicate that the SEC did not consider ether to be a security at that time. The SEC staff has reportedly provided informal assurances in the past to a handful of promoters that their digital assets are not securities. On the other hand, the SEC has brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question arewere securities.sold as investment contracts, and therefore were securities under the federal securities laws. The CFTC has for years consideredconsiders ether to be a commodity subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, and ether futures have been listed for years on CFTC‑regulated exchanges while cleared ether swaps have been listed for trading on CFTC‑regulated swap execution facilities not registered with the SEC without being deemed “mixed swaps” subject to joint CFTC and SEC jurisdiction to the Sponsor’s knowledge.

Current and future federal or state legislation, CFTC and SEC rulemaking and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which ether is treated. In particular, although the Interpretive Release classified ether as a “digital commodity” and not a security under the U.S. federal securities laws, ether may nonetheless in the future be classified by the CFTC as a “commodity interest” under the CEA, or a court or a future SEC administration could conclude that ether is a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws notwithstanding the Interpretive Release. The Sponsor, the Trustee and the Trust cannot be certain as to how future regulatory developments will impact the treatment of ether under the law. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the TrusteeSponsor decides to terminate the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders.

This information should be read in conjunction with the financial statements and notes to financial statements included in Item 1 of Part I of this Form 10‑Q. The discussion and analysis that follows may contain statements that relate to future events or future performance. In some cases, such forward‑lookingforward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “may,” “should,” “could,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. These statements are only predictions. Actual events or results may differ materially. These statements are based upon certain assumptions and analyses made by the Sponsor on the basis of its perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors it believes are appropriate in the circumstances. Whether or not actual results and developments will conform to the Sponsor’s expectations and predictions, however, is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including the special considerations discussed below, general economic, market and business conditions, changes in laws or regulations, including those concerning taxes, made by governmental authorities or regulatory bodies, and other world economic and political developments. Although the Sponsor does not make forward-looking statements unless it believes it has a reasonable basis for doing so, the Sponsor cannot guarantee their accuracy. Except as required by applicable disclosure laws, neither the Trust nor the Sponsor is under a duty to update any of the forward-looking statements to conform such statements to actual results or to a change in the Sponsor’s expectations or predictions.

The financial statements and accompanying notes are prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP in the United States. The preparation of these financial statements relies on estimates and assumptions that impact the Trust’s financial position and results of operations. These estimates and assumptions affect the Trust’s application of accounting policies. A description of the valuation of ether, a critical accounting policy that the Trust believes is important to understanding its results of operations and financial position, is provided in the section entitled “Valuation of Ether; The CF BenchmarkBenchmarks Index,” above. In addition, please refer to Note 2 to the financial statements included in this report for further discussion of the Trust’s accounting policies.

The Quarter Ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026

The Trust’s net asset value decreased from $10,300,756,520 at December 31, 2025 to $6,378,405,156 at March 31, 2026 to $4,292,908,953 at June 30, 2026, a 38.08%32.70% decrease. The decrease in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from a decrease in the price of ether, which fell 29.27%24.21% from $2,971.55 at December 31, 2025 to $2,101.84 at March 31, 2026 to $1,593.01 at June 30, 2026. The decrease in the Trust’s net asset value was also affected by a decrease in the number of outstanding Shares, which fell from 458,720,000 Shares at December 31, 2025 to 401,880,000 Shares at March 31, 2026 to 357,120,000 Shares at June 30, 2026, a consequence of 74,680,00057,360,000 Shares (1,8671,434 Baskets) being created and 131,520,000102,120,000 Shares (3,2882,553 Baskets) being redeemed during the quarter.

The 29.34%24.26% decrease in the NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $22.46 at December 31, 2025 to $15.87 at March 31, 2026 to $12.02 at June 30, 2026 is directly related to the 29.27%24.21% decrease in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV decreased slightly more than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the Sponsor’s fee, which was $4,969,537$3,867,493 for the quarter, or 0.06% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $8,064,642,007$6,203,930,952 during the quarter.

The NAV of $25.50$18.33 on JanuaryApril 14,17, 2026 was the highest during the quarter, compared with a low during the quarter of $14.01$11.75 on FebruaryJune 23,5, 2026.

The net decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the quarter ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026 was $2,996,490,501,$1,502,122,404, resulting from a net realized loss of $3,289,963$2,881,521 from ether sold to pay expenses, a net realized loss of $737,719,591$468,786,637 from ether sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $191,019,080$620,771,962 from ether paid for the in-kind redemptions of Shares,Shares and an unrealized loss on investment in ether of $2,059,492,330$405,814,791 and a net investment loss of $4,969,537.$3,867,493. Other than the Sponsor’s fee of $4,969,537,$3,867,493, the Trust had no expenses during the quarter.