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ETHV 10-K & 10-Q changes, risk factors and insider trading

VanEck Ethereum ETF · CBOE · Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers · CIK 1860788 · All filings on SEC.gov

Everything below is quoted or computed from VanEck Ethereum ETF's public SEC filings. It is not a recommendation to buy or sell. Automated comparisons can contain errors; confirm with the original filing.

At a glance

2 / 2risk-factor paragraphs added / removed in latest 10-K
0new risk-factor headings
0Form 4 filings reporting open-market purchases (last 180 days)
0Form 4 filings reporting open-market sales (last 180 days)

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What changed in the latest 10-K

Comparing 10-K filed 2026-03-30 (period ending 2025-12-31) with 10-K filed 2025-03-26 (period ending 2024-12-31).

Risk Factors (10-K Item 1A)

2new paragraphs
2removed paragraphs
41reworded paragraphs
50,683 → 50,470words in section

Largest changes (selected automatically by length and topic keywords; quoted verbatim, no commentary)

Reworded topics: liquidity, regulation

Paragraph as it now reads, with added and removed wording marked:

InEven particular,with the Trust’sSEC inabilitystaff’s torecent facilitatestatement that in-kind creations and redemptions are not prohibited by SEC regulations, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV per Share,NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. substantial. Furthermore, if cash orderscreations or redemptions are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders orders, the unavailability of Liquidity Providers or otherwise, it will not be possible for Authorized Participants will be limited in their ability to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism would bemay unavailable.not function as efficiently. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s inabilitylimited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting relative reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation ofor redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences.
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Reworded topics: liquidity

Paragraph as it now reads, with added and removed wording marked:

The processes of creation and redemption of Shares (which depend on on timely transfers of ethereumETH to and by the ETH Custodian and through the Clearing Services) could be disrupted or encounter challenges due to, for example, the price volatility of ETH, the insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or other problems affecting the ETH Custodian, in its capacity as ETH Custodian under the Custody Agreement and and the provider of Clearing Services under the Clearing Agreement. Also, the change from the Trust’s originally contemplated model of in-kind creations and redemptions to the current model involving cash creations and redemptions, could cause potential market participants, such as the Authorized Participants and Liquidity Providers, who would otherwise be willing to purchase or redeem Baskets or ETH, as applicable, to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity arising from discrepancies between the price of the Shares and the price of the underlying ETH, tomay decide not to take the risk that, as a result of those difficulties, they may not be able to realize the profit they expect, and reduce their transactions with or even refrain entirely from transacting with the Trust, which could disrupt the processes of creation and redemption of Shares. If such events rise to the level of an emergency or cause creations and redemptions of Shares to be impracticable, the Sponsor may suspend the process of creation and redemption of Baskets. Any disruptions to the process of creating and redeeming Shares could cause trading spreads, and the resulting premium or discount, on Shares compared to NAV to widen. Alternatively, in the case of a Ethereum network outage or other problems affecting the Ethereum network, the processing of transactions on the Ethereum network may be disrupted, which in turn may prevent Liquidity ProvidersProviders, or Authorized Participants or their designees, from depositing or withdrawing ETH from their their accounts at the EthereumETH Custodian, which in turn could affect the creation or redemption of Baskets. If this is the case, the liquidity liquidity of the Shares may decline and the price of the Shares may fluctuate independently of the price of ETH and may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. Furthermore, in the event that the market for ethereumETH should become relatively illiquid and thereby materially restrict opportunities for arbitraging, the price of the Shares may diverge from the value of ETH.
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Reworded topics: liquidity

Paragraph as it now reads, with added and removed wording marked:

Furthermore, because the number of liquid and credible ETH trading platforms is limited, the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate will necessarily be composed of a limited number of ETH ETH trading platforms. If a ETH trading platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, in the case of the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, the calculation agent would have limited ability to remove such ETH trading platform platform from the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, which could skew the price of ETH as represented by the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Trading on a limited number of ETH trading platform may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity liquidity of ETH and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.
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Reworded

Paragraph as it now reads, with added and removed wording marked:

Authorized Participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. ThereOn May 15, 2025, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets and FINRA’s Office of General Counsel stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on whetherthe andspecific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with theseSEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ETH. Until further regulatory clarity emerges regarding whether registered broker-dealers can hold and deal in ETH under such rules, there is a risk that registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for ETH may be unable to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. While compliance with theserules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. Only As acertain result,Authorized Participants, at present, have the SEC is unlikelyability to permitalso, anthrough exchangetheir toaffiliates, adoptsupport listingin-kind rules for a product if it is not clear that the exchange’s members would be able to comply with applicable rules when transacting in the product as designed. To the extent further regulatory clarity emerges, the Sponsor expects the Exchange to seek In-Kind Regulatory Approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to createcreation and redeemredemption Shares in-kind for ETH, in which Authorized Participants or their designees would deposit ETH directly with the Trust or receive ethereum directly from the Trust. However, there can be no assurance as to when such regulatory clarity will emerge, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain In-Kind Regulatory Approval, if at all.activity.
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Removed text
“To the knowledge of the Sponsor, exchange-traded products for all spot-market commodities other than bitcoin and ETH, such as gold and silver, employ in-kind creations and redemptions with the underlying asset. …”
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New text
“from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool are publicly visible, any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation may also discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum network in general. …”
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Full comparison: every changed paragraph (45)

Green = added, red = removed. Unchanged paragraphs, 1 paragraphs where only numbers/dates changed, and tables are not shown. Read the complete text in the original filing.

Reworded

Such events have occurred in connection with digital assets in the past. past. For example, in September 2014, the Chinese digital asset exchange Huobi announced that it had sent approximately 900 ethereums ether and 8,000 Litecoins (worth approximately $400,000 at the prevailing market prices at the time) to the wrong customers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation published an announcement that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of approximately $1.5 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Bybit, on or about February 21, 2025.

Reworded

We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop airdrop (defined below), or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” The only crypto asset to be held by the Trust will be ethereum.ETH. The Trust has adopted the following procedures to address situations involving any fork, airdrop or similar event that results in the issuance of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that the Trust may receive. The Trust Agreement stipulates that if a fork occurs, the Sponsor shall determine which asset constitutes ethereumETH and which network constitutes the Ethereum network, and the Sponsor will as soon as possible cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Because the Trust will abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency, the Trust would not receive any direct or indirect consideration for the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and thus the value of the Shares will not reflect the value of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency will not be taken into account for purposes of determining NAV. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that is not ethereumETH in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders. There can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain this approval, if at all.

Reworded

MarketVector has relied upon ETH market data in developing its analysis analysis of the ETH market. This analysis has informed MarketVector’s understanding of the ETH market, the design of the Trust and the design of the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The continued viability of the Trust relies upon access to to accurate data, and MarketVector’s continued ability to effectively analyze such data. If data is inaccurate or becomes unavailable, or if MarketVector’s analysis of such data is incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected.

Reworded

The value of the Shares of the Trust are represented by the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate that may also be subject to momentum pricing due to speculation regarding future appreciation in value of ETH, leading to greater volatility that could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Momentum pricing typically is associated with growth stocks and other assets whose valuation, as determined by the investing public, accounts for future appreciation in value, if any. The Sponsor believes that momentum pricing of ETH has resulted, and may continue to result, in speculation regarding future appreciation in the value of ETH, inflating and making the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate more volatile. As a result, ETH may be more likely to fluctuate in value due to changing investor confidence, which could impact future appreciation or depreciation in the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and could adversely affect the value of the Trust.

Reworded

If increases in throughput on the Ethereum network lag behind growth in usage of ETH, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. The Ethereum network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds. In December 2017, the popularity of the blockchain-based game Cryptokitties led to significant network congestion on the Ethereum network. The game, which allows players to trade and create virtual virtual kitties, represented by non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”), was reported by some sources to have accounted for more than 10% of the entire Ethereum network traffic at the time causing increases in transaction fees and delays in transaction processing times, and driving Ethereum network traffic to a reported then-all time high. Since April 30, 2023, ETH transaction fees have decreased from from $9.52 per ETH transaction, on average, to a high of $3.83 per transaction, on average, on April 20, 2024. As of May 20, 2024, ETH ETH transaction fees were $2.82 per transaction, on average. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ETH (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ETH, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. As of January 31, 2025, 2024,2026, ETH transaction fees were averaging $2.01$0.84476 per transaction.

Added

from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool are publicly visible, any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation may also discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum network in general. In addition, it is possible regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

Reworded

Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading in the global digital asset trading market, market, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of ETH and/or negatively affect the market perception of ETH. If they were to affect trading at a trading platform which is used to calculate the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, they could cause the Trust’s NAV to be calculated incorrectly and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. See “—The MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected by manipulative or fraudulent practices in the global ETH market or at constituent trading platforms.”

Reworded

Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ETH. Because a large portion of the digital asset market still depends on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that a disorderly de-pegging or a run on Tether or USDC could lead to dramatic market volatility in digital assets more broadly. Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins or potential manipulative activity when unbacked stablecoins are used to pay for other digital assets (including ETH), or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as exchanges, that support stablecoins, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins away from the Ethereum network, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins, reduce liquidity in the ETH market, and affect the value of ETH, and in turn impact an investment in the Shares. Given Bitfinex is currently a component of the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and Bitfinex and Tether are understood to be under common ownership and management, problems with Tether specifically could potentially affect pricing of transactions on Bitfinex or otherwise disrupt Bitfinex’s operations.

Reworded

Risks Associated with the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate

Reworded

The MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate has a limited history.

Reworded

The MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate was developed by MarketVector and has a limited history. MarketVector has substantial discretion at any time to change the methodology used to calculate calculate the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including the constituent trading platforms that contribute prices to the Trust’s NAV. MarketVector does not have any obligation to take the needs of the Trust, the Trust’s Shareholders, or anyone else into consideration in connection with such changes. There is no guarantee that the methodology currently used in calculating the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate will appropriately track the price of ETH in the future.

Reworded

The MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is based on various various inputs which may include price data from various third-party trading platforms and markets. MarketVector does not guarantee the validity of any of these inputs, which may be subject to technological error, manipulative activity, or fraudulent reporting from their initial source. The MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could be calculated now or in the future in a way that adversely affects an investment in the Trust.

Reworded

The MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could fail to track the global ETH price, and a failure of the MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Reworded

Although the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is intended intended to accurately capture the market price of ETH, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ETH on public or private markets markets not included among the constituent trading platforms used in calculating the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ethereum on the various constituent trading platforms used in calculating the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different trading platforms. For example, the Bullish platform employs a proprietary order book combining a traditional limit order book with automated market maker instructions. As their automated market maker relies on a mathematical formula and does not rely on any external pricing data or third-party source, differences in the bids and asks placed by the automated market maker compared to prices offered by other digital currency trading venues, or other external market data sources, for the same digital assets may emerge. While the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate provides a U.S. dollar-denominated composite index for the price of ETH based on, at any given time, the prices on each such constituent trading platforms or pricing source may not be equal to the value of an ETH as represented by the Index. It is possible that the price of ETH on the ETH trading platforms could be materially higher or lower than the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate price. To the extent the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate price differs materially from the actual prices available on a ETH trading platforms used to calculate it, or the global market price of ETH, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the global market price of ETH, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability ability to track the market price of ETH. To the extent such prices differ materially from the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Reworded

If the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is not available, the Trust’s holdings may be fair valued in accordance with the policy approved by the Sponsor. To the extent the valuation determined determined in accordance with the policy approved by the Sponsor differs materially from the actual market price of ETH, the price of the Shares may no longer track, whether temporarily or over time, the global market price of ETH, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust by reducing investors’ confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the global market price of ETH. To the extent such prices differ materially from the market price for ETH, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Reworded

MarketVector has relied upon ETH market data in developing its analysis analysis of the ETH market. This analysis has informed MarketVector’s understanding of the ETH market, the design of the Trust and the design of the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The continued viability of the Trust relies upon access to to accurate data, and MarketVector’s continued ability to effectively analyze such data. If data is inaccurate or becomes unavailable, or if MarketVector’s analysis of such data is incorrect, the value of an investment in the Trust may be adversely affected.

Reworded

The MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate used to calculate calculate the value of the Trust’s ETH may be volatile, adversely affecting the value of the Shares.

Reworded

The price of ETH on public digital asset trading platforms has a a limited history, and during this history, ETH prices on the digital asset markets more generally, and on digital asset exchanges individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual digital asset trading platforms, the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, and the price of ETH generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by digital asset trading platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Reworded

Furthermore, because the number of liquid and credible ETH trading platforms is limited, the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate will necessarily be composed of a limited number of ETH ETH trading platforms. If a ETH trading platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, in the case of the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, the calculation agent would have limited ability to remove such ETH trading platform platform from the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, which could skew the price of ETH as represented by the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Trading on a limited number of ETH trading platform may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity liquidity of ETH and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

Reworded

The MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected by manipulative or fraudulent practices in the global ETH market or at constituent trading platforms.

Reworded

The global ETH market may be subject to fraud and manipulation, see see “—Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of ETH trading platforms, which may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, they may experience fraud, manipulation, security failures failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ETH and, consequently, the value of the Shares,” and the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be affected to the extent they cause global prices of ETH to be subject to factors other than bona fide market forces.

Reworded

Fraud or manipulation may also affect the constituent trading platforms platforms used to calculate the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. For example, Coinbase paid $6.5 million in 2021 to settle a CFTC enforcement action for reckless false, misleading, or inaccurate reporting as well as wash trading by a former employee on Coinbase’s GDAX platform. According to the CFTC’s order, during the relevant period prior to the enforcement action, Coinbase operated at least two trading programs which generated orders that, at times, matched with one another. Coinbase included the transactional information for these transactions, such as price and volume data, on its website and provided that information to reporting services, either directly or through access to its website, resulting in a perceived volume and level of liquidity of digital assets, including ethereum, on GDAX that was false, misleading or inaccurate. Additionally, between August and September 2016, the CFTC order finds that a former Coinbase employee intentionally placed buy and sell orders in the Litecoin/Bitcoin trading pair on GDAX, which he intended to match with one another and result in no loss or gain while creating the appearance of liquidity and trading interest in Litecoin. Ultimately, the transactions resulted in wash transactions that depicted a misleading picture of the Litecoin/Bitcoin market.

Reworded

Fraudulent and manipulative trading practices remain a risk at many cryptocurrency trading platforms. To the extent they occur at constituent trading platforms used to calculate the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, they could cause the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to report inaccurate prices of ETH, ETH, causing the NAV of the Trust to be calculated incorrectly and thereby causing Shareholders to suffer losses.

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If the computers or other facilities of the index administrator, data data providers and/or relevant constituent ETH platforms malfunction for any reason, calculation and dissemination of the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be delayed. Errors in the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate data, the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate computations and/or construction may occur from time to time and may not be identified and/or corrected for a period of time or at all, which may have an adverse impact on the Trust and the Shareholders. Any of the foregoing may lead to the errors in the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, which may lead to a different investment outcome for the Trust and the Shareholders than would have been the case had such events not occurred.

Reworded

The MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate Price being used to determine the net asset value of the trust may not be consistent with GAAP. To the extent that the Trust’s financial statements statements are determined using a different pricing source that is consistent with GAAP, the net asset value reported in the Trust’s periodic periodic financial statements may differ, in some cases significantly, from the Trust’s net asset value determined using the MarketvectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate Pricing.

Reworded

The Trust will determine the NAV of the Trust on each Business Day based based on the value of ETH as reflected by the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The methodology used to calculate the the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to value ETH in determining the net asset value of the Trust may not be deemed consistent with GAAP. To the extent the methodology used to calculate the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is deemed deemed inconsistent with GAAP, the Trust will utilize a GAAP-consistent pricing source for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements. Creation and redemption of Baskets, the Sponsor’s management fee and other expenses borne by the Trust will be determined using the Trust’s net asset value determined daily based on the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. Such net asset value of the Trust determined using the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may differ, in some cases significantly, from the net asset value reported in the Trust’s periodic financial statements.

Reworded

The Sponsor can remove the MarketvectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate and use a different pricing or valuation methodology instead.

Reworded

Under the Trust Agreement, the Sponsor has the exclusive authority to to select, remove, change, or replace the pricing or valuation methodology or policies used to value the Trust’s assets and determine determine NAV and NAV per Share, in its sole discretion. The Sponsor has the right to change the pricing source used to determine NAV and NAV per Share from the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate to a different source or index. To the extent that there are material changes to the pricing or valuation methodology or policies or the pricing source described within this paragraph, notification will be made to Shareholders via a prospectus supplement and/or a current report filed with the SEC.

Reworded

The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated unrelated to the price of ETH and the ETH trading platforms included in the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate that may may have an adverse effect on the price of the Shares. These factors include the following factors:

Reworded

The processes of creation and redemption of Shares (which depend on on timely transfers of ethereumETH to and by the ETH Custodian and through the Clearing Services) could be disrupted or encounter challenges due to, for example, the price volatility of ETH, the insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or other problems affecting the ETH Custodian, in its capacity as ETH Custodian under the Custody Agreement and and the provider of Clearing Services under the Clearing Agreement. Also, the change from the Trust’s originally contemplated model of in-kind creations and redemptions to the current model involving cash creations and redemptions, could cause potential market participants, such as the Authorized Participants and Liquidity Providers, who would otherwise be willing to purchase or redeem Baskets or ETH, as applicable, to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity arising from discrepancies between the price of the Shares and the price of the underlying ETH, tomay decide not to take the risk that, as a result of those difficulties, they may not be able to realize the profit they expect, and reduce their transactions with or even refrain entirely from transacting with the Trust, which could disrupt the processes of creation and redemption of Shares. If such events rise to the level of an emergency or cause creations and redemptions of Shares to be impracticable, the Sponsor may suspend the process of creation and redemption of Baskets. Any disruptions to the process of creating and redeeming Shares could cause trading spreads, and the resulting premium or discount, on Shares compared to NAV to widen. Alternatively, in the case of a Ethereum network outage or other problems affecting the Ethereum network, the processing of transactions on the Ethereum network may be disrupted, which in turn may prevent Liquidity ProvidersProviders, or Authorized Participants or their designees, from depositing or withdrawing ETH from their their accounts at the EthereumETH Custodian, which in turn could affect the creation or redemption of Baskets. If this is the case, the liquidity liquidity of the Shares may decline and the price of the Shares may fluctuate independently of the price of ETH and may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. Furthermore, in the event that the market for ethereumETH should become relatively illiquid and thereby materially restrict opportunities for arbitraging, the price of the Shares may diverge from the value of ETH.

Reworded

InCreation addition,Baskets may be created or redeemed in exchange for ETH or cash. At present, only certain Authorized Participants have the ability to support in-kind creation and redemption activity. The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, creates transaction costs of buying and selling ETH that are not present in an in-kind model. These costs include the bid-ask spread along with the operational costs from the labor and overhead involved in calculating, executing, monitoring, and accounting for transactions in the ETH markets and related cash movements. Furthermore, there are timing costs involved in the risk that the ETH price moves between the time when the NAV is established for a creation/redemption and the time when the ETH is traded (“slippage”). In addition, Liquidity Providers must settle ETH transactions with the Trust within a contractually specified time period, subject to customary exceptions. If the Liquidity Provider fails to perform its obligations within the contractually specified time period, the Trust would seek to use an alternate Liquidity Provider to execute the ETH transaction. However, the pricing or terms of the ultimate ETH transaction conducted through the alternate Liquidity Provider, if one is available, after the failure of the original Liquidity Provider to perform its obligations could deviate, potentially significantly, from the pricing or terms of the transaction that the Trust originally entered with the original Liquidity Provider. Transaction costs and slippage would be reduced if the Trust were permittedable to use an in-kind creation and redemption model. The Trust’s Authorized Participant Agreement provides that transaction costs and slippage related to Basket creation and redemption are the responsibility of the Authorized Participant. Whether Authorized Participants who are unable to support in-kind creation and redemption activity and Liquidity Providers as market participants will find it economically viable or commercially attractive to participate in a cash creation and redemption model for a ETH exchange-traded product like the Trust, including a cash creation and redemption model where the Trust selects the Liquidity Provider with whom it executes transactions to buy or sell ETH and the Authorized Participant is not permitted to designate the Liquidity Provider from whom ETH is purchased or sold in connection with the Authorized Participant’s Basket subscription or redemption, is not known; however, there is a risk they will not. If the Trust is unable to attract sufficient Authorized Participants and Liquidity Providers, it will be unable to maintain an efficient arbitrage mechanism for keeping the trading price of the Shares in line with NAV and the value of the underlying ETH held by the Trust, which could negatively affect Shareholders and cause them to purchase or sell Shares at a premium or discount to the value of the underlying ETH, causing losses; alternatively, it could be unable to operate, as there would be no parties who would be able to create new Shares or redeem existing Shares, leading to the Trust being unsuccessful commercially and the Sponsor deciding to terminate and wind up the Trust’s operations. There can be no assurance that In-Kind Regulatory Approval will ever be obtained or that in-kind subscription or redemption transactions will ever occur, meaning that the Trust may conduct subscriptions and redemptions solely in cash for the foreseeable future and indefinitely if necessary. In addition, a failure to settle ETH transactions with Liquidity Providers could disrupt the calculation of the Trust’s NAV or potentially cause inaccuracies in NAV calculation, which could disrupt the Trust’s operations or cause Shareholders to suffer losses.

Removed

The Trust is currently only able to conduct subscriptions and redemptions in cash, which means that an Authorized Participant will deposit cash into, or accept cash from, the Trust’s account with the Cash Custodian in connection with the creation and redemption of Baskets, and will obtain or receive ETH in exchange for cash in connection with such order. However, and in common with other spot ETH exchange-traded products, the Trust is not at this time able to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with Authorized Participants in exchange for ETH.

Reworded

Authorized Participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. ThereOn May 15, 2025, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets and FINRA’s Office of General Counsel stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on whetherthe andspecific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with theseSEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ETH. Until further regulatory clarity emerges regarding whether registered broker-dealers can hold and deal in ETH under such rules, there is a risk that registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for ETH may be unable to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. While compliance with theserules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. Only As acertain result,Authorized Participants, at present, have the SEC is unlikelyability to permitalso, anthrough exchangetheir toaffiliates, adoptsupport listingin-kind rules for a product if it is not clear that the exchange’s members would be able to comply with applicable rules when transacting in the product as designed. To the extent further regulatory clarity emerges, the Sponsor expects the Exchange to seek In-Kind Regulatory Approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to createcreation and redeemredemption Shares in-kind for ETH, in which Authorized Participants or their designees would deposit ETH directly with the Trust or receive ethereum directly from the Trust. However, there can be no assurance as to when such regulatory clarity will emerge, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain In-Kind Regulatory Approval, if at all.activity.

Removed

To the knowledge of the Sponsor, exchange-traded products for all spot-market commodities other than bitcoin and ETH, such as gold and silver, employ in-kind creations and redemptions with the underlying asset. The Sponsor believes that it is generally more efficient, and therefore less costly, for spot commodity exchange-traded products to utilize in-kind orders rather than cash orders, because there are fewer steps in the process and therefore there is less operational risk involved when an authorized participant can manage the buying and selling of the underlying asset itself, rather than depend on an unaffiliated party such as the issuer or sponsor of the exchange-traded product. As such, a spot commodity exchange-traded product that only employs cash creations and redemptions and does not permit in-kind creations and redemptions is a novel product that has not been tested over a long period of time, and could be impacted by any resulting operational inefficiencies.

Reworded

InEven particular,with the Trust’sSEC inabilitystaff’s torecent facilitatestatement that in-kind creations and redemptions are not prohibited by SEC regulations, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV per Share,NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. substantial. Furthermore, if cash orderscreations or redemptions are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders orders, the unavailability of Liquidity Providers or otherwise, it will not be possible for Authorized Participants will be limited in their ability to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism would bemay unavailable.not function as efficiently. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s inabilitylimited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting relative reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation ofor redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences.

Reworded

Even if In-Kind Regulatory Approval were obtained,Further, there can be no assurance that in-kind creations or redemptions of the Shares will be available in the future, or that broker-dealers would be willing to serve as Authorized Participants with respect to the in-kind creation and redemption of Shares. Any of these factors could adversely affect affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.

Reworded

There is no guarantee that the Trust will meet its investment objective. objective. Factors that may affect the Trust’s ability to meet its investment objective include, without limitation: (1) Liquidity Providers’ ability and willingness to purchase and sell ETH in an efficient manner to effectuate creation and redemption orders; (2) transaction fees associated with the Ethereum network; (3) the ETH market becoming illiquid or disrupted; (4) the Trust’s Share prices being rounded to the nearest cent and/or valuation methodologies; (5) the need to conform the Trust’s portfolio holdings to comply with investment restrictions or policies or regulatory or tax law requirements; (6) early or unanticipated closings of the markets on which ETH trades, resulting in the inability of Liquidity Providers to execute intended portfolio transactions; (7) accounting standards; (8) Authorized Participants refraining from participating in creation and redemption of Baskets; and (9) the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate becoming disrupted or unavailable.

Reworded

The Sponsor could decide to replace the ETH Custodian as a custodian custodian of the Trust’s ETH, pursuant to the Custody Agreement. Similarly, the ETH Custodian under the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement may terminate the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately, upon the occurrence of a Termination Event (as defined below) that is incapable of being cured within ten business days or if it determines in its sole discretion it is necessary to take such action to comply with applicable laws and regulations or in connection with Gemini’s fraud or other compliance program. Under the Custody Agreement, a “Termination Event” occurs when (i) any representation, warranty, certification or statement made by the Trust was or becomes incorrect in any material respect when made; (ii) the Trust materially breaches, or fails in any material respect to perform any of its obligations under the Custody Agreement; (iii) the Trust requests a postponement of maturity or a moratorium with respect to any indebtedness or is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or there is commenced against the Trust a case under any applicable bankruptcybankruptcy, ,insolvencyinsolvency or other similar law now or hereafter in effect, or the Trust files a petition for bankruptcy or an application for an arrangement with its creditors, seeks or consents to the appointment of a receiver, administrator or other similar official for all or any substantial part of its property, admits in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, or takes any corporate action in furtherance of any of the foregoing, or fails to meet applicable legal minimum capital requirements; or (iv) a change of control of the Trust, or an event, change or development that causes or is likely to cause a material adverse effect on the Trust, or in the ability of the Trust to fulfill its responsibilities under the Custody Agreement, occurs. Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the ETH Custodian to another custodian may be complex and could subject the Trust’s ETH to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Also, if the ETH Custodian becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, defaults on or fails to perform its obligations under the Custody Agreement or Clearing Agreement with the Trust, or abruptly discontinues the services it provides to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations would be adversely affected.

Reworded

The Sponsor has the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, which it has delegated to the Administrator. The Administrator will determine the Trust’s ETH holdings and ETH holdings per Share on a daily basis as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m. ET on each business day. The Administrator’s Administrator’s determination is made utilizing data from the operations of the Trust and the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, calculated at 4:00 p.m. ET on such day. To the extent that the ETH holdings or ETH holdings per Share are incorrectly calculated, calculated, the Sponsor will not be liable (absent gross negligence or wilful misconduct) for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Reworded

If the Sponsor determines in good faith that the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate does not reflect an accurate ETH price, then the Sponsor will instruct the Administrator to employ an alternative method to determine the fair value of the Trust’s assets. There are no predefined criteria to make a good faith assessment as to which of the rules the Sponsor will apply and the Sponsor may make this determination in its sole discretion. The Administrator may calculate the NAV in a manner that ultimately inaccurately reflects the price of ETH. To the extent that the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, or the Administrator’s or the Sponsor’s other valuation methodology are incorrectly calculated, neither the Sponsor, the Administrator nor the Trustee may be liable for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the index used to calculate NAV or other valuation method used to calculate the net asset value of the Trust. Any such change in the index or other valuation method could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust.

Reworded

To the extent the methodology used to calculate the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate is deemed not to be consistent with GAAP, the Trust’s periodic financial statements may not utilize the the Trust’s NAV or the Trust’s NAV per Share. For purposes of the Trust’s financial statements, the Trust will utilize a pricing source that is consistent with GAAP, as of the financial statement measurement date. The Sponsor will determine in its sole discretion the valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements. To the extent that such valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements result in an inaccurate price, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the valuation method used to calculate the net asset value to be reported in the Trust’s financial statements. Any such change in such valuation method could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust.

Reworded

If the Trust is not properly classified as a grantor trust, the Trust might be classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes. However, due to the uncertain treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes, future developments regarding the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If the Trust were classified as a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the tax consequences of owning Shares generally would not be materially different from the tax consequences described herein, although there might be certain differences, including with respect to timing of the recognition of taxable income or loss and (in certain circumstances) withholding taxes. In addition, tax information reports provided to beneficial owners of Shares would be made in a different form. If the Trust were not classified as either a grantor trust or a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes, it generally would be classified as a corporation for such purposes. If it were treated as a corporation, the Trust would be subject to entity-level U.S. federal income tax (currently at the rate of 21%), plus possible state and/or local taxes, on its net taxable income, and certain distributions made by the Trust to Shareholders would be treated as taxable dividends to the extent of the Trust’s current and accumulated earnings and profits. Any such dividend distributed to a beneficial owner of Shares that is a non-U.S. person for U.S. federal income tax purposes generally would be subject to U.S. federal withholding tax at a rate of 30% (or such lower rate as provided in an applicable tax treaty).

Reworded

The Ruling & FAQs do not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S.-source U.S.-source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income. Non-U.S. shareholders should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a non-U.S. shareholder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such non-U.S. shareholder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. The Sponsor has committed to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency to which the Trust may become entitled in the future. However, there can be no assurance that these abandonments would be treated as effective for U.S. federal income tax purposes, or that the Sponsor will continue to cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Digital AssetVirtual Currency if there are future regulatory developments that would make it feasible for the Trust to retain those assets.

Added

interests without regard to the interests of the Trust or its Shareholders, and any increases, decreases or other changes in such investments could affect the Index price and, in turn, the value of the Shares;

Reworded

In certain circumstances, the Trust’s ETH investments may may be valued using techniques other than reliance on the price established by the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate. The Sponsor will monitor for significant events related to crypto assets that may impact the value of ETH and will determine in good faith, and in accordance with its valuation policies and procedures, whether to fair value the Trust’s ETH on a given day based on whether certain pre-determined criteria have been met. For example, if the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate deviates by more than a pre-determined amount from an alternate benchmark available to the Sponsor, then the Sponsor may determine to utilize the alternate benchmark. The Sponsor evaluates its fair value criteria and the factors in determining such criteria from time to time and no less than quarterly. The Sponsor may also fair value the Trust’s ETH using observed market transactions from one or more exchanges. The Sponsor may also fair value the Trust’s ETH using a combination of inputs in certain situations (e.g., using observed market transactions, OTC quotations from brokers, etc.). The value of the Shares of the Trust established by using the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate may be different from what would be produced through the use of another methodology. ETH or other digital asset investments that are valued using techniques other than those employed by the MarketVectorTM MarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate, including ETH investments that are “fair valued,” may be subject to greater fluctuation in their value from one day to the next than would be the case if market-price valuation techniques were used.

Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) (10-K Item 7)

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1,274 → 1,126words in section

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Removed text
“On June 25, 2024 (date of initial ether investment), the Seed Shares were redeemed for cash and the Seed Capital Investor purchased the Seed Creation Baskets, comprising of 200,000 Shares at a per-Share price of $50.00. Total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of the Seed Creation Baskets were $10,000,000, which resulted in the Trust receiving 2,929.06 ethereum. Delivery of the Seed Creation Baskets was made on June 26, 2024. The Seed Capital Investor acted as a statutory underwriter in connection with this purchase.”
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Reworded

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The Trust’s NAV increased from $100,000$146,428,902 at May 20,December 31, 2024 to $146,428,902 $157,578,941 at December 31, 2024,2025, a 146,329%7.61% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which increased from 2,000 Shares at May 20, 2024 to 3,000,000 Shares at December 31, 2024.2024 to 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025. This is the net result of 2,000 Seed Shares and 3,400,0003,225,000 Shares (136129 Baskets) being created and 2,000 Seed Shares and 400,0002,600,000 Shares (16104 Baskets) being redeemed redeemed during the period, partially offset by a decrease in the price of ETH, which contracted 2.37%10.86% from $3,414$3,333 at June 25,December 31, 2024 to $3,333 $2,971 at December 31, 2024.2025.
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Net increasedecrease in net assets resulting from operations for the twelve-month twelve-month period ended December 31, 2024,2025, was $8,627,398$ 33,759,054 resulting from an net unrealized appreciationdepreciation on investment in ethereum of $10,194,816, $34,062,356, a net realized lossgain of $1,567,418$492,055 on ethereum sold for the redemption of SharesShares, a net realized gain of $16,597 from ethereum sold to pay expenses during the twelve-month period, and a net investment incomeloss of $0.$205,350. TheOther than the Sponsor Fee of $205,350, the Trust had no other expenses during the periodtwelve-month as the Sponsor Fee was waived by the Sponsor.period.
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Removed text
“From January 1, 2024 to May 20, 2024 (date of Seeding), the Trust had no operations other than a sale to the Seed Capital Investor, the parent of the Sponsor, of 2,000 Shares at a per-Share price of $50.00. Delivery of the Seed Shares was made on May 20, 2024. Total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of the Seed Shares were $100,000.”
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The 2.38%10.94% decrease in the NAV per Share from $50.00$48.81 at May 20,December 31, 2024 to $48.81$43.47 at December 31, 20242025 is directly related to the 2.37%10.86% decrease in the price of ETH during this period.
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The NAV per Share of $59.67$70.58 on DecemberAugust 6,22, 2024,2025, was the highest during during the period, compared with a low during the period of $32.59$21.45 on SeptemberApril 6,8, 2024.2025.
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Full comparison: every changed paragraph (7)

Green = added, red = removed. Unchanged paragraphs, 1 paragraphs where only numbers/dates changed, and tables are not shown. Read the complete text in the original filing.

Reworded

The Trust’s NAV is calculated based on the Trust’s net asset holdings as reconciled to the ETH Custodians’ accounts on a market approach, determined on a daily basis in accordance with with the MarketVectorTMMarketVector Ethereum Benchmark Rate price at 4:00 p.m. ET. The Trust’s NAV per Share is calculated by taking the current market value of its total assets, subtracting any liabilities, and then dividing that total by the total number of outstanding Shares. The Trust Agreement gives the Sponsor the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, which it has delegated to the Administrator.

Removed

From January 1, 2024 to May 20, 2024 (date of Seeding), the Trust had no operations other than a sale to the Seed Capital Investor, the parent of the Sponsor, of 2,000 Shares at a per-Share price of $50.00. Delivery of the Seed Shares was made on May 20, 2024. Total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of the Seed Shares were $100,000.

Removed

On June 25, 2024 (date of initial ether investment), the Seed Shares were redeemed for cash and the Seed Capital Investor purchased the Seed Creation Baskets, comprising of 200,000 Shares at a per-Share price of $50.00. Total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of the Seed Creation Baskets were $10,000,000, which resulted in the Trust receiving 2,929.06 ethereum. Delivery of the Seed Creation Baskets was made on June 26, 2024. The Seed Capital Investor acted as a statutory underwriter in connection with this purchase.

Reworded

The Trust’s NAV increased from $100,000$146,428,902 at May 20,December 31, 2024 to $146,428,902 $157,578,941 at December 31, 2024,2025, a 146,329%7.61% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which increased from 2,000 Shares at May 20, 2024 to 3,000,000 Shares at December 31, 2024.2024 to 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025. This is the net result of 2,000 Seed Shares and 3,400,0003,225,000 Shares (136129 Baskets) being created and 2,000 Seed Shares and 400,0002,600,000 Shares (16104 Baskets) being redeemed redeemed during the period, partially offset by a decrease in the price of ETH, which contracted 2.37%10.86% from $3,414$3,333 at June 25,December 31, 2024 to $3,333 $2,971 at December 31, 2024.2025.

Reworded

The 2.38%10.94% decrease in the NAV per Share from $50.00$48.81 at May 20,December 31, 2024 to $48.81$43.47 at December 31, 20242025 is directly related to the 2.37%10.86% decrease in the price of ETH during this period.

Reworded

The NAV per Share of $59.67$70.58 on DecemberAugust 6,22, 2024,2025, was the highest during during the period, compared with a low during the period of $32.59$21.45 on SeptemberApril 6,8, 2024.2025.

Reworded

Net increasedecrease in net assets resulting from operations for the twelve-month twelve-month period ended December 31, 2024,2025, was $8,627,398$ 33,759,054 resulting from an net unrealized appreciationdepreciation on investment in ethereum of $10,194,816, $34,062,356, a net realized lossgain of $1,567,418$492,055 on ethereum sold for the redemption of SharesShares, a net realized gain of $16,597 from ethereum sold to pay expenses during the twelve-month period, and a net investment incomeloss of $0.$205,350. TheOther than the Sponsor Fee of $205,350, the Trust had no other expenses during the periodtwelve-month as the Sponsor Fee was waived by the Sponsor.period.

What changed in the latest 10-Q

Comparing 10-Q filed 2026-08-13 (period ending 2026-06-30) with 10-Q filed 2026-05-14 (period ending 2026-03-31).

Risk Factors (10-Q Part II, Item 1A)

Heads-up: the two versions of this section differ a lot in length (4,212 vs 10,416 words). That can mean the company reorganized its report or that our automatic section detection picked up the wrong boundaries. Please check the original filings before relying on this comparison.
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New heading “The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.”

New heading “A temporary or permanent “fork” of the Ethereum blockchain could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops.”

New heading “Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks or “airdrops.””

Largest changes (selected automatically by length and topic keywords; quoted verbatim, no commentary)

New text topics: bankruptcy, department of justice, ftc, liquidity
“Extreme volatility may persist and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. …”
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New text
“The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.”
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New text topics: breach
“Modifications are typically introduced by core developers in the form of EIPs, and are often followed by a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. …”
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“A temporary or permanent “fork” of the Ethereum blockchain could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops.”
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New text topics: penalt
“On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve is intended to be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. …”
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New text topics: fine
“We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop (defined below), or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” The only crypto asset to be held by the Trust will be ETH. The Trust has adopted the following procedures to address situations involving any fork, airdrop or similar event that results in the issuance of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that the Trust may receive. …”
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Full comparison: every changed paragraph (34)

Green = added, red = removed. Unchanged paragraphs and tables are not shown. Read the complete text in the original filing.

Added

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

Added

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including ETH, over the course of 2021, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for ETH. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout ETH’s history, including in 2017-2018, in 2021-2022, and in 2025-2026. Over the course of 2023, 2024, and the first quarter of 2025, ETH prices continued to exhibit extreme volatility. After reaching an all-time high of approximately $4830 in August 2025, the price of ETH declined to below $1570 in June 2026, representing a drawdown of more than 65%, and there can be no assurance that the price of ETH will not decline further. For example, ETH lost approximately 12.2% of its value according to some sources in mid-October 2025 as part of wider digital asset market turmoil, widely attributed to global trade tensions, which triggered a number of dislocations in the digital asset market (the “October 2025 Flash Crash”), including liquidations of up to $20 billion in collateral in the form of various digital assets (including, but not limited to, ETH) securing trades (particularly perpetual futures contracts and various forms of financing transactions), along with reported service interruptions, halted orders, forced unwinding of trades, and other issues, across centralized and decentralized exchanges. Digital asset prices, including the price of ETH, declined significantly during the first half of 2026. As of the date of this report, the price of ETH remains significantly below its August 2025 all-time high, and digital asset prices continue to fluctuate significantly.

Added

Extreme volatility may persist and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset exchanges by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, digital asset prices, including ETH, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny has increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities, and the digital asset industry remains subject to significant attention from regulators, legislators and policymakers. These events are continuing to develop and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.

Added

The prices for some digital assets including ETH have risen following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Some expect the new administration to adopt a more constructive attitude toward the digital asset industry than prior administrations were perceived to have done and work toward providing greater regulatory clarity and certainty for emerging technologies including blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development. Certain members of Congress have also expressed similar sentiments. To the extent market expectations about future activity by the administration or Congress lead digital assets prices and valuations to increase, there can be no assurance such expectations will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to this as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not currently exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide greater regulatory clarity and certainty for blockchain technology and digital assets, such as through promulgating a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets that lives up to industry expectations, could lead to a decline in prices for digital assets including ETH, which could cause declines in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political winds or market perceptions of them will not shift over time.

Added

In addition, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”), which establishes a federal framework for payment stablecoins, was enacted in July 2025. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (the “CLARITY Act”), which is intended to establish a federal market-structure framework for certain digital assets, passed the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2025 and was advanced by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in May 2026. In July 2026, Senate Republicans released updated bill text, but the CLARITY Act has not been enacted and its prospects remain uncertain. Delays in, changes to, or adverse developments relating to implementation of the GENIUS Act, enactment of the CLARITY Act or similar legislation, or other federal or state regulatory actions could negatively affect market sentiment, liquidity, trading activity, or the prices of digital assets, including ETH. Any resulting decline in the price of ETH could cause a reduction in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses.

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On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve is intended to be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. criminal or civil proceedings or in satisfaction of penalties imposed by executive agencies. The Order directs the Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin for the Bitcoin Reserve. As established by the Order, the Bitcoin Reserve will not contain ETH, and there can be no assurance, and there is no present indication, that it would be changed to include ETH in the future. The Digital Asset Stockpile is intended to be capitalized initially with digital assets other than bitcoin forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, which could include ETH; however, there will be no new acquisitions of ETH as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. While legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives that would direct the acquisition of one million bitcoin by the federal government over a five-year period, no similar federal legislation has been introduced that would expressly provide for acquiring ETH. Even if such legislation providing for the acquisition of ETH were to be introduced at the federal level, it could fail to pass. If now or in the future, the U.S. federal government or any state government or any instrumentality thereof does not announce ETH acquisition plans, or does announce such plans but these plans fall short of market expectations, the price of ETH may decline, which may impact Share value. Further, executive orders such as the Order are subject to change and can be reversed or overturned. The enduring existence and size of the Digital Asset Stockpile is subject to complex challenges and uncertainty that makes it difficult to evaluate its effect on the value of ETH and the Shares, now or in the future. There can be no assurance that any particular legislation will ever be introduced or passed at either the federal or state level providing for the acquisition of ETH by governmental instrumentalities.

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Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of ETH and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ETH.

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A temporary or permanent “fork” of the Ethereum blockchain could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops.

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Ethereum software is open source. Any user can download the software and participate in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community adopt the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks (referred to as “volitional forksˮ because they take place through a formal process).

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In the case of volitional forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code called EIPs. Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, core developers are not monolithic. At the protocol level, certain core developers may support a given change while others oppose it. Developers of certain Ethereum Clients may support the change and incorporate the change into an update to their particular Ethereum Consensus Client or Execution Client, while developers of other Ethereum Clients may not do so. In addition, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source individual for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, which they will likely not do unless a critical mass of validators and users - such as DApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of DApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum Blockchain or Ethereum network - support the shift as well. If no such critical mass emerges, node operators will not download the change, and the upgrades will lack adoption.

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Modifications are typically introduced by core developers in the form of EIPs, and are often followed by a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. Typically, after a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and validators express support, leading to node operators consenting to the modification by choosing to download it, the change is implemented at a specific block number on the Ethereum network and the network continues to operate uninterrupted on a single blockchain. However, if less than a substantial majority of core developers (whether at the protocol level or the individual Ethereum Client level), users, validators and node operators consent to the proposed modification, but the modification is nonetheless implemented by some core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, users and validators, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “fork” (i.e., split) of the Ethereum network (and the Ethereum Blockchain), with one version (employed by those core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, validators and users who rejected the change) running the pre- modified software and the other (employed by core developers, Ethereum Clients, node operators, validators and users who chose to adopt the change) running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two (or more) versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel, but with each version’s ETH lacking interchangeability, and with different blockchains, transaction histories, and ownership ledgers associated with each. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum “forked” into Ethereum and a new digital asset, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach in which an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ETH held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a “fork” that effectively reversed the hack. However, a minority of users, developers, and validators continued to develop and use the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic” with the digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ether Classic, or ETC. In practice, the two networks would compete with each other for users, developers, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants, and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed relevant thresholds of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack. If such a contentious hard fork were to occur on the Ethereum Blockchain in the future, it could cause the Ethereum network to lose users, validators and developers, and could cause ETH to lose value, adversely affecting the price of the Shares. The pre-fork and post-fork blockchains could compete against each other for users, validators and developer talent, to their mutual detriment.

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Such a fork in the Ethereum Blockchain typically would be addressed by community-led efforts to merge the forked Ethereum Blockchains, and several prior forks have been so merged. Since the Ethereum network’s inception, modifications to the Ethereum network have generally been accepted by the majority of users, developers, and validators ensuring that the Ethereum network remains a coherent economic system and the focal point of the majority of developer activity. There is no assurance, however, that this will continue to be the case, and if it is not, then the price of ETH could be negatively affected. The original blockchain and the forked blockchain could potentially compete with each other for users, developers, and validators leading to a loss of these for the original blockchain. A fork of any kind could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate and the Trust’s procedures may be inadequate to address the effects of a fork.

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A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. As with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network in connection with a hard fork could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ETH. A hard fork could also adversely affect the price of ETH at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. If a hard fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value, or cause users and validators to abandon the Ethereum network in favor of other competing digital asset networks and blockchains. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares.

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On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a volitional fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. For example, EIP 4844 is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Proponents hope it will achieve this objective by, among other things, providing Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network’s blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time, thereby reducing demands for storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s, which caused the data to remain permanently on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. This is expected by proponents of Dencun to reduce the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and potentially more effective as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ETH prices (as the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ETH to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ETH prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored shortly thereafter. As with any change to software code, volitional forks such as Dencun or other such forks could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ETH, and therefore the Shares.

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In September 2022, the Ethereum network transitioned to a proof-of-stake consensus model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum network occurred, as a small number of Ethereum validators and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network, which is not backwards-compatible with the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain, is considered a forked branch and was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.” Unlike proof-of-work, in which validators expend computational resources to compete to validate transactions and are rewarded ETH in proportion to the amount of computational resources expended, in proof-of-stake, miners (also called validators) risk or “stake” ETH to compete to be randomly selected to validate transactions and are rewarded ETH in accordance with an algorithm calibrated according to the number of validators who have staked ETH. Any malicious activity by a miner, such as mining multiple blocks, disagreeing with the eventual consensus or otherwise violating protocol rules, results in the forfeiture or slashing (as defined below) of a portion of the staked ETH. Proof-of-stake is viewed as more energy efficient and scalable than proof-of-work. There can be no assurance that these or other benefits will be realized, and failure to achieve these intended benefits could cause ETH to lose some or all of its value, and could adversely affect the price of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.

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Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued digital assets exchanges through at least October 2016. A digital assets exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ether Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. In November 2016, the Ethereum network underwent a hard fork, Spurious Dragon, that was intended to provide some protection against replay attacks. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validator pool’s hashing power to exceed the relevant threshold of the processing power of the network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital assets that rely on that network, which could include ETH, more susceptible to attack. Any of these events could cause the Ethereum network to be less attractive to potential users, including smart contract and decentralized application developers, or cause a decline in speculative interest, and thereby cause ETH to decline in value, causing a corresponding decrease in the price of the Shares.

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In addition to a volitional hard fork, a fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Recently, such an accidental fork reportedly occurred in the Go-Ethereum (“Geth”) client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time), and a patch was released that all users of the Geth Client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all users of Geth did so, resulting with the non-patched Geth users temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum Blockchain than the patched Geth users and users of other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum Blockchain, causing the non-patched Geth users to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the users of the Ethereum Blockchain, interrupting their access to the Ethereum network. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all users of the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth users, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network. In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future accidental or unintentional fork, a substantial number of users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, unlike Bitcoin, which has a single widely-accepted reference implementation in Bitcoin Core, after the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run both an Execution Client and a Consensus Client paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate seamlessly with each other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate seamlessly with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unexpected hard fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ETH to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares.

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The Ethereum network regularly implements volitional hard forks in order to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed volitional hard forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub-stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, Ethereum underwent the Berlin and Altair hard forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris hard forks (collectively constituting the Merge). In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai hard forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Layer 1 Ethereum network’s blockchain for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain following the Merge). On May 7, 2025, “Pectra,” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, went live. Pectra, among other changes, increased the maximum effective balance for a single validator from 32 ETH to 2,048 ETH (EIP-7251), allowing validators to consolidate multiple validators into one, reducing network overhead and operational costs, though potentially affecting the degree of validator decentralization on the network; and introduced a new form of account abstraction (EIP-7702), allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to execute smart contract code, enabling programmable wallet features such as transaction bundling, gasless transactions, and custom recovery schemes. In December 2025, the Ethereum network implemented the Fusaka hard fork, which was designed to expand data capacity, reinforce defenses against denial-of-service attacks, and introduce new tools for developers and users, among others. The main feature of the Fusaka upgrade is a new way of handling the data in the blobs introduced by the Dencun upgrade. The Ethereum core developers have announced a further planned upgrade, referred to as “Glamsterdam,” which is expected to be implemented in the second half of 2026. Any of these or future hard forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ETH. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

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Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks or “airdrops.”

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We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop (defined below), or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” The only crypto asset to be held by the Trust will be ETH. The Trust has adopted the following procedures to address situations involving any fork, airdrop or similar event that results in the issuance of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that the Trust may receive. The Trust Agreement stipulates that if a fork occurs, the Sponsor shall determine which asset constitutes ETH and which network constitutes the Ethereum network, and the Sponsor will as soon as possible cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Because the Trust will abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency, the Trust would not receive any direct or indirect consideration for the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and thus the value of the Shares will not reflect the value of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency will not be taken into account for purposes of determining NAV. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that is not ETH in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders. There can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain this approval, if at all.

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In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promotors of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital asset. Neither the Trust nor the Sponsor shall be under any obligation to claim or attempt to secure or realize any economic benefit from “airdropped” assets, and the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably and permanently abandon, for no consideration, such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency associated with the airdropped assets in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders.

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With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event. As such, Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks, and the Trust is not able to participate in any airdrop. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to change this policy.

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Even if required regulatory approval is sought and obtained, Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, airdrops, or similar events, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

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In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum network, the Sponsor will, if permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine which network should be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and in doing so may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

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In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum network, the Sponsor will, if permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Ethereum network, is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of the Ethereum Network, users, service providers, businesses, miners and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, mining power on, and community engagement with, the Ethereum network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, security vendors and MarketVector on what is generally accepted as ETH and should therefore be considered “ETH” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result.

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There is a lack of consensus regarding the the regulation of digital assets, including ETH, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. ManyCongress is currently considering several bills relating to the regulation of thesedigital assets and stablecoins, which may not pass and be enacted in their present form or at all. Many state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or ETH in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate.

Reworded

The 2022 Events, including among others the the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset platforms, platforms,exchanges and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset platformsexchanges and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital asset industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends.

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U.S. federal and state regulators, as well as the White House, have issued reports and releases concerning crypto assets, including ETH and crypto asset markets. Further, in 2023 the House of Representatives formed two new subcommittees: the Digital Assets, Financial Technology and Inclusion Subcommittee and the Commodity Markets, Digital Assets, and Rural Development Subcommittee, each of which were formed in part to analyze issues concerning concerning crypto assets and demonstrate a legislative intent to develop and consider the adoption of federal legislation designed to address the perceived need for regulation of and concerns surrounding the crypto industry. However, the extent and content of any forthcoming laws and regulations are not yet ascertainable with certainty, and it may not be ascertainable in the near future. We cannotThe predictimpact howof these and other related events will affect us oron the cryptoTrust, the digital asset business.industry, and the value of the Shares cannot be predicted.

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There remains substantial uncertainty regarding the regulation of digital assets, including ETH, and their markets, notwithstanding certain recent federal interpretive actions intended intended to provide additional clarity. On March 17, 2026, the SEC issued an interpretive release (the “Interpretive Release”) regarding regarding the application of the federal securities laws to certain types of digital assets and certain transactions involving digital assets.,assets, and the CFTC concurrently provided guidance that it and its staff will administer the Commodity Exchange Act consistent with that interpretation. Among other things, the Interpretive Release introduces a taxonomy for crypto assets; addresses how a non-security crypto asset may become subject to, and may cease to be subject to, an investment contract; and clarifies the application of the federal securities laws to airdrops, protocol mining, protocol staking and the wrapping of a non-security crypto asset. Although the March 17, 2026 interpretive guidance may provide greater clarity in certain respects, this guidance is not binding law, may be revised, and does not eliminate uncertainty, particularly with respect to the regulatory treatment of specific activities or transactions involving crypto assets. In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. The chair expressed a need for the SEC to have additional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from “falling between regulatory cracks,” as well as for more resources to protect investors in “this growing and volatile sector.” The chair called for federal legislation centering on digital asset trading, lending, and decentralized finance platforms, seeking “additional plenary authority” to write rules for digital asset trading and lending. It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the CFTC, SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.

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Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Ethereum network were to adopt any of these privacy-enhancing features, features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. Europol, the European Union’s Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In May 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. persons from using Blender.io, a digital asset mixing application that operates on the Ethereum Blockchain to obfuscate the origin, destination and counterparties of blockchain transactions, by adding certain digital asset wallet addresses associated with Blender.io to its Specially Designated Nationals list. Blender.io receives a variety of transactions and mixes them together before transmitting them to their ultimate destinations. On March 23, 2022, Lazarus Group, a state-sponsored cyber hacking group associated with North Korea, carried out a major virtual currency heist from a blockchain project linked to the online game Axie Infinity; Blender.io was used in processing some of the illicit proceeds. The U.S. Treasury Department’s press release announcing the sanctions on Blender.io observed that, while most virtual currency activity is licit, virtual currency can be used for illicit activity, including sanctions evasion, through mixers, peer-to-peer exchangers, darknet markets, and exchanges. This includes the facilitation of heists, ransomware schemes, and other cybercrimes. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum Blockchain were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions - such as many digital asset platforms, or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Cash Custodian - to reduce support for or cease offering services for ETH or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ETH, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.

Removed

On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum Blockchain were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions - such as many digital asset platforms, or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Cash Custodian - to reduce support for or cease offering services for ETH or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ETH, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.

Reworded

Depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may be considered a “security” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. Public,The thoughSEC non-binding,staff statementshas madereportedly provided informal assurances in the past by senior officials at the SEC and endorsed by its previous Chairman in a letter to a memberhandful of Congresspromoters appearedthat totheir indicate thatdigital assets are not securities. On the SECother didhand, not consider ETH to be a security at that time. Thethe SEC has brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question are securities. The CFTC has for years considered ETH to be a commodity subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, supported by certain federal district court decisions, and ETH Futuresfutures have been listed for years on CFTC-regulated exchanges while cleared ETH swaps have been listed for trading on CFTC-regulated swap execution facilities not registered with the SEC without being deemed “mixed swaps” subject to joint CFTC and SEC jurisdiction to the Sponsor’s knowledge.

Reworded

In the Interpretive Release, the SEC stated that, based on its current understanding of the digital asset markets, etherETH is a “digital commodity” and not itself a security. Although the Interpretive Release represents the official position of the SEC, it is not itself a statute or binding rule, does not supersede or replace the Howey test, is based on the SEC’s current understanding of the digital asset markets, and may be refined, revised or expanded. In addition, a court, regulator, or future administration could take a different view, and future legislation, rulemaking, enforcement positions, judicial decisions or other developments could result in ether,ETH, the Trust, the Shares or transactions involving etherETH being treated differently than contemplated by the Interpretive Release. Any such developments could adversely affect the Trust and the value of the Shares.

Reworded

If a digital asset is determined or asserted to be a security, it is likely to become difficult or impossible for the digital asset to be traded, cleared or custodied in the United States through the same channels used by non-security digital assets, which in addition to materially and adversely affecting the trading value of the digital asset is likely to significantly impact its liquidity and market participants’ ability to convert the digital asset into U.S. dollars. For example, in 2020 the SEC filed a complaint against the issuer of XRP, Ripple Labs, Inc., and two of its executives, alleging that they raised more than $1.3 billion through XRP sales that should have been registered under the federal securities laws, but were not. In the years prior to the SEC’s action, XRP’s market capitalization at times reached over $140 billion. However, in the weeks following the SEC’s complaint, XRP’s market capitalization fell to less than $10 billion, which was less than half of its market capitalization in the days prior to the complaint. Although the SEC and Ripple reached a settlement in August 2025 to resolve the enforcement action and to dismiss their respective court appeals, which has largely been viewed as positive in the digital assets market, there remains continued uncertainty as to the regulatory framework that will be applied by the SEC and courts to digital assets. The SEC’s action against XRP’s issuer underscores the continuing uncertainty around which digital assets are securities, and demonstrates that such factors as how long a digital asset has been in existence, how widely held it is, how large its market capitalization is and that that it has actual usefulness in commercial transactions, ultimately may have no bearing on whether the SEC or a court will find it to to be a security. There is currently legislation that is being proposed and considered that addresses this regulatory uncertainly, uncertainty, but it is unclear if the proposed legislation will be passed.

Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) (10-Q Part I, Item 2)

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“The Six Months Ended June 30, 2026”
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“The Trust’s NAV decreased from $157,578,941 at December 31, 2025 to $77,828,275 at June 30, 2026, a 50.61% decrease. The decrease in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from a decrease in the price of ETH, which decreased 46.50% from $2,971.01 at December 31, 2025 to $1,589.53 at June 30, 2026. The number of Shares outstanding also decreased from 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025 to 3,350,000 Shares at June 30, 2026, a net result of 1,200,000 Shares (48 Baskets) being created and 1,475,000 Shares (59 Baskets) being redeemed during the six months ended June 30, 2026.”
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“Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the six months ended June 30, 2026, was $(70,557,703) resulting from the net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investment in ETH of $(50,016,186), a net realized loss of $(20,374,218) on ETH sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $(52,041) from ETH sold to pay expenses during the six months, and a net investment loss of $115,528. Other than the Net Sponsor Fee of $115,258, the Trust has no other expenses during the six months ended June 30, 2026.”
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The Trust’s NAV decreased from $157,578,941 at December 31, 2025 to $106,775,700 at March 31, 2026 to $77,828,275 at June 30, 2026, a 32.24%27.11% decrease. The decrease in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from a decrease in the price of ETH, which decreased 29.28%24.35% from $2,971.01 at December 31, 2025 to $2,101.20 at March 31, 2026 to $1,589.53 at June 30, 2026. The number of Shares outstanding also decreased from 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025 to 3,475,000 Shares at March 31, 2026 to 3,350,000 Shares at June 30, 2026, a net result of 1,000,000200,000 Shares (408 Baskets) being created and 1,150,000325,000 Shares (4613 Baskets) being redeemed during the period.three months ended June 30, 2026.
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Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the three quartermonths ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026, was $44,780,413$(25,777,290) resulting from the net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) onfrom investment in ETH of $30,226,986, $(19,789,200), a net realized loss of $14,464,858$(5,909,360) on ETH sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $24,939$(27,102) from from ETH sold to pay expenses during the quarter,three months, and a net investment loss of $63,630.$51,628. Other than the Net Sponsor Fee of $63,630,$51,628, the Trust has no other expenses during the quarter.three months ended June 30, 2026.
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“The 46.56% decrease in the NAV per Share from $43.47 at December 31, 2025 to $23.23 at June 30, 2026 is primarily related to the 46.50% decrease in the price of ETH during the six months ended June 30, 2026.”
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Reworded

The QuarterThree Months Ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026

Reworded

The Trust’s NAV decreased from $157,578,941 at December 31, 2025 to $106,775,700 at March 31, 2026 to $77,828,275 at June 30, 2026, a 32.24%27.11% decrease. The decrease in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from a decrease in the price of ETH, which decreased 29.28%24.35% from $2,971.01 at December 31, 2025 to $2,101.20 at March 31, 2026 to $1,589.53 at June 30, 2026. The number of Shares outstanding also decreased from 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025 to 3,475,000 Shares at March 31, 2026 to 3,350,000 Shares at June 30, 2026, a net result of 1,000,000200,000 Shares (408 Baskets) being created and 1,150,000325,000 Shares (4613 Baskets) being redeemed during the period.three months ended June 30, 2026.

Reworded

The 29.31%24.41% decrease in the NAV per Share from $43.47 at December 31, 2025 to $30.73 at March 31, 2026 to $23.23 at June 30, 2026 is directlyprimarily related to the 29.28%24.35% decrease in the price of ETH during thisthe period.three months ended June 30, 2026.

Reworded

The NAV per Share of $49.37$35.50 on JanuaryApril 14,17, 2026, was the highest during during the quarter,three months, compared with a low during the quarterthree months of $27.12$22.75 on FebruaryJune 23,5, 2026.

Reworded

Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the three quartermonths ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026, was $44,780,413$(25,777,290) resulting from the net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) onfrom investment in ETH of $30,226,986, $(19,789,200), a net realized loss of $14,464,858$(5,909,360) on ETH sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $24,939$(27,102) from from ETH sold to pay expenses during the quarter,three months, and a net investment loss of $63,630.$51,628. Other than the Net Sponsor Fee of $63,630,$51,628, the Trust has no other expenses during the quarter.three months ended June 30, 2026.

Added

The Six Months Ended June 30, 2026

Added

The Trust’s NAV decreased from $157,578,941 at December 31, 2025 to $77,828,275 at June 30, 2026, a 50.61% decrease. The decrease in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from a decrease in the price of ETH, which decreased 46.50% from $2,971.01 at December 31, 2025 to $1,589.53 at June 30, 2026. The number of Shares outstanding also decreased from 3,625,000 Shares at December 31, 2025 to 3,350,000 Shares at June 30, 2026, a net result of 1,200,000 Shares (48 Baskets) being created and 1,475,000 Shares (59 Baskets) being redeemed during the six months ended June 30, 2026.

Added

The 46.56% decrease in the NAV per Share from $43.47 at December 31, 2025 to $23.23 at June 30, 2026 is primarily related to the 46.50% decrease in the price of ETH during the six months ended June 30, 2026.

Added

The NAV per Share of $49.37 on January 14, 2026, was the highest during the six months, compared with a low during the six months of $22.75 on June 5, 2026.

Added

Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations for the six months ended June 30, 2026, was $(70,557,703) resulting from the net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investment in ETH of $(50,016,186), a net realized loss of $(20,374,218) on ETH sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $(52,041) from ETH sold to pay expenses during the six months, and a net investment loss of $115,528. Other than the Net Sponsor Fee of $115,258, the Trust has no other expenses during the six months ended June 30, 2026.

ETHV insider buying and selling (Form 4)

Since 2026-04-11, insiders reported open-market purchases in 0 Form 4 filings and open-market sales in 0 filings. Totals add up every open-market (code P and S) line in those filings, using the prices reported in the filings. Awards, option exercises, tax withholding and gifts are listed below but not counted.

No Form 4 stock transactions in this period.

Well-known investors holding ETHV (13F)

None of the 59 investors we track reported a position in their latest 13F.

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