HZEN 10-K & 10-Q changes, risk factors and insider trading
Grayscale Horizen Trust (ZEN) · OTC · Commodity Contracts Brokers & Dealers · CIK 1748945 · All filings on SEC.gov
At a glance
What changed in the latest 10-K
Risk Factors
New heading “Smart contracts are a new technology and ongoing development may magnify initial problems, cause volatility on the networks that use smart contracts and reduce interest in them, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ZEN.”
New heading “The Horizen protocol and its underlying technologies were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ZEN and an investment in the Shares.”
New heading “The SEC may approve applications under Rule 19b-4 of the Exchange Act to list competing digital assets as exchange-traded products, which could reduce demand for, and the price of, ZEN and adversely impact the value of the Shares.”
New heading “The Trust is an “emerging growth company” and the reduced disclosure requirements applicable to emerging growth companies may make the Shares less attractive to investors.”
New heading “The tax treatment of ZEN and transactions involving ZEN for state and local tax purposes is not settled.”
Removed heading “There is significant uncertainty around the EON 2.0 Migration, and it is possible that developments related to the EON 2.0 Migration may adversely impact the operations of the Trust or the value of the Shares.”
Removed heading “If the digital asset award for mining blocks and transaction fees for recording transactions on the Horizen Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize miners, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate mining activities, miners may cease expanding processing power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares.”
Removed heading “Failure of funds that hold digital assets or that have exposure to digital assets through derivatives to receive SEC approval to list their shares on exchanges could adversely affect the value of the Shares.”
Removed heading “If regulators or public utilities take actions that restrict or otherwise impact mining activities, there may be a significant decline in such activities, which could adversely affect the Horizen Network and the value of the Shares.”
Removed heading “DCG is a minority interest holder in Coinbase, Inc., one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate Price.”
Removed heading “DCG holds a minority interest in the parent company of the Custodian, which could lead DCG to cause the Sponsor to take actions that favor the Custodian’s interests over the Trust’s interests.”
Largest changes
While smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms more stable, larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers andsee in full comparisonmalwaremalware.andFortheirexample,shortcomingsin February 2025, hackers reportedly compromised a transaction from Bybit’s multisignature cold wallets, enabling the hackers to steal over $1.5 billion of Ether from Bybit. Shortcomings or ultimate failures of larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem,including on the price of ZEN,and therefore may also be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example,in February 2014, Mt. Gox, the largest Digital Asset Trading Platform at the time, halted withdrawals of Bitcoin and subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan following an exploit that resulted in the loss of several hundred thousand Bitcoin. In the two weeks following the halt of Bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one Bitcoin fell on other trading platforms from around $795 to $578. Failure and shortcomings of large Digital Asset Trading Platforms have since continued; in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 Bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets, and in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 Bitcoin, then worth around $78 million, were stolen from Bitfinex. The value of Bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct Digital Asset Trading Platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based Digital Asset Trading Platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following an exploit that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. In January 2018, the Japanese Digital Asset Trading Platform, Coincheck, was exploited, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian Digital Asset Trading Platform, Bitgrail, was exploited, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, Binance, was exploited, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. More recently,in November 2022, FTX, another of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, filed for bankruptcy protection and subsequently halted customer withdrawals as well as trading on its FTX.US platform. Fraud, security failures and operational problems all played a role in FTX’s issues and downfall. Moreover, Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been a subject of enhanced regulatory and enforcement scrutiny, and Digital Asset Markets have experienced continued instability, following the failure of FTX. In particular, in June 2023, the SEC brought the Binance Complaint and Coinbase Complaint, alleging that Binance and Coinbase operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought the Kraken Complaint, alleging that Kraken operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency. Between February 2025 and May 2025, the SEC entered into court-approved joint stipulations to dismiss each of the Binance Complaint, Coinbase Complaint and the Kraken Complaint. The SEC has terminated its investigation or enforcement action into many other digital asset market participants as well.
“These events have also led to a substantial increase in regulatory and enforcement scrutiny of the industry as a whole and of Digital Asset Trading Platforms in particular, including from the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress. For example, in June 2023, the SEC brought charges against Binance (the “Binance Complaint”) and Coinbase (the “Coinbase Complaint”), alleging that they solicited U.S. …”see in full comparison
“These events have led to a substantial increase in regulatory and enforcement scrutiny of the industry as a whole and of Digital Asset Trading Platforms in particular, including from the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress. For example, in June 2023, the SEC brought charges against Binance (the “Binance Complaint”) and Coinbase (the “Coinbase Complaint”), two of the largest digital asset trading platforms, alleging that they solicited U.S. …”see in full comparison
“As part of its counterparty onboarding process, each of the Authorized Participant and the Liquidity Provider uses third-party services to screen prospective counterparties against various watch lists, including the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and countries and territories identified as non-cooperative by the Financial Action Task Force. …”see in full comparison
“In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. …”see in full comparison
“When the Trust and the Sponsor, acting on behalf of the Trust, sell or deliver, as applicable, ZEN, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency, they generally do not transact directly with counterparties other than the Authorized Participant, a Liquidity Provider, or other similarly eligible financial institutions that are subject to federal and state licensing requirements and maintain practices and policies designed to comply with AML and KYC regulations. …”see in full comparison
Full comparison: every changed paragraph (162)
A temporary or permanent “fork” or a “clone” could adversely affect the value of the Shares;
The limited history of the Reference Rate;
Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets could have a negative impact on the price of ZEN and adversely affect the value of the Shares;
The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose challenges to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ZEN and to the operations of the Trust;
AnThe Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor could be subject to regulation as a money service business or money transmitter, which could result in extraordinary expenses to the Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor and also result in decreased liquidity for the Shares;
The Trust may be required to disclose information, including information relating to investors, to regulators;
The Sponsor’s services may be discontinued, which could be detrimental to the Trust; and If the Custodian resigns or is removed by the Sponsor, or otherwise, without replacement, it could trigger early termination of the Trust.
If the Custodian resigns or is removed by the Sponsor, or otherwise, without replacement, it could trigger early termination of the Trust; and The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ZEN and to the operations of the Trust.
The trading prices of many digital assets, including ZEN, have experienced extreme volatility throughout their existence, including in recent periodsperiods, and may continue to do so. For instance, following significant increases throughout the majority of 2020, digital asset prices, including ZEN, experienced significant volatility throughout 2021 and 2022.
This volatility became extreme in November 2022, when FTX, then a major Digital Asset Trading Platform, halted customer withdrawals. Additionally, on October 10, 2025, it was reported that a sharp decline in digital asset market prices triggered the liquidation of approximately $20 billion in leveraged positions across the digital asset industry. Any similar halting of withdrawals or liquidations across leveraged positions in the digital asset industry in the future could further impact trading prices. See “—Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity.” Digital asset prices, including ZEN, have continued to fluctuate widely throughout 2024 and through the date of this Annual Report.
Furthermore, changes in U.S. political leadership and economic policies may create uncertainty that materially affects the price of ZEN and the Trust’s Shares. For example, on March 6, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order to establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and a United States Digital Asset Stockpile. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve will be capitalized with Bitcoin owned by the Department of Treasury that was forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, and the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce are authorized to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin, provided that those strategies impose no incremental costs on American taxpayers. Conversely, the Digital Asset Stockpile will consist of all digital assets other than Bitcoin owned by the Department of Treasury that were forfeited in criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, but the U.S. government will not acquire additional assets for the U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile beyond those obtained through such proceedings. The anticipation of a U.S. government-funded strategic cryptocurrency reserve had motivated large-scale purchases of certain digital assets in the expectation of the U.S. government acquiring such assets to fund such reserve, and the market price of such digital assets decreased significantly as a result of the ultimate content of the Executive Order. Any similar action or omission by the U.S. federal administration or other government authorities with respect to ZEN or other digital assets may negatively and significantly impact the price of ZEN and the Trust’s Shares.
Digital assets such as ZEN were only introduced within the past two decades, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recentnessrecency of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developersdevelopers, and minersvalidators, and the potential for malicious activity. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:
DigitalCertain digital asset networks and related protocols are in the early stages of development. Given the recency of the development of digital asset networks and related protocols, digital assets and the underlying digital asset networks and related protocols may not function as intended and parties may be unwilling to use digital assets, which would dampen the growth, if any, of digital asset networks and related protocols.
Digital asset networks and related protocols are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network or related protocol, such as the HorizenBase Network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ZEN, and, consequently, their value.
Adoption of proposed protocol updates is determined by the outcome of governance votes through the Horizen DAO and, in certain cases, by whether developers and users elect to interact with updated smart contracts. In some cases, not all participants may adopt a given upgrade, and if different groups of participants deploy or interact with incompatible smart-contract versions, this could lead to a divergence or “fork” in the Horizen protocol, resulting in separate token or application states on Base.
Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. These attempts to increase the volume of transactions may not be effective.
The acceptance of software patches or upgrades to a digital asset network by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and miners in a digital asset network, such as the Horizen Network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate blockchain networks.
Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage.
ZENDigital isassets have only recently become selectively accepted as a means of payment by retail and commercial outlets, andbut there is no meaningful degree of use of ZEN as a means of payment by consumersretail remainsor limited.commercial outlets. Banks and other established financial institutionsinstitutions, whether voluntarily or in response to regulatory feedback, may refuse to process funds for ZEN transactions; process wire transfers to or from Digital Asset Trading Platforms, ZEN-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in ZEN. As a result, the prices of ZEN are largely determined by speculators and miners,speculators, thus contributing to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept ZEN in the future. While the use of other digital assets, such as Bitcoin, to purchase goods and services from commercial or service businesses is developing, ZEN has not yet been accepted in the same manner due to its infancy and because ZEN has a slightly different purpose than Bitcoin.
The prices of digital assets may be determined on a relatively small number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms by a relatively small number of market participants, many of whom are speculators or those intimately involved with the issuance of such digital assets, such as miners or developers, which could contribute to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept digital assets in the future.
Certain privacy-preserving features have been or are expected to be introduced to a number of digital asset networks. ZEN removed some of its privacy features in September 2023. Nevertheless, tradingTrading platforms or businesses that facilitate transactions in ZEN may be at an increased risk of having banking services cut off if there is a concern its privacy features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks. For example, in September 2022, the Digital Asset Trading Platform Huobi delisted seven digital assets with privacy preserving features, including ZEN, a move that Huobi explained was “in compliance with the latest financial regulations.” However, in September 2023, the Horizen protocol implemented an update intended to deprecate these privacy shields, with the intent of causing it to no longer be considered a “privacy coin,” and, following the update, the Horizen Network no longer supported transactions from unshielded addresses to shielded addresses. It is unclear whether the removal of those types of shielded transactions from Horizen would mitigate these concerns by regulators, law enforcement agencies, and other digital asset market participants regarding ZEN.
Users, developersdevelopers, and minersother ecosystem members may switch to or adopt certain digital asset networks or protocols at the expense of their engagement with other digital asset networks and protocols, which may negatively impact those networks and protocols, including the Horizen Network.
ZEN is designed to fosterfacilitate sidechainthe operations,use of compliance-oriented privacy-enabling technology by other applications on the Base Network, but it has not been widely adoptedadopted. even inIf the contextHorizen of ZEN transactions. If ZEN’sprotocol’s capabilities are not more widely utilized, itZEN may struggle to compete with other digital assets.
Horizen’s privacy-preserving features may have been seen by some as primary attributes distinguishing ZEN from its competitors. Horizen's upgradeintegration deprecatingof shieldedcompliance-oriented poolsfunctionalities could diminish ZEN's popularity, which could adversely affect the value of ZEN.
Changes in the governance of a digital asset network or protocol may not receive sufficient support from usersHorizen andDAO miners,members, which may negatively affect that digital asset network’s or protocol’s ability to grow and respond to challenges.
The governance of some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Horizen Network, is generally by voluntary consensus andof openvoters competition.in Forthe suchHorizen networksDAO. and protocols,Nonetheless, there may be a lack of consensusconsensus, participation, or clarity on that network’s or protocol’s governance, which may stymie such network’s or protocol’s utility, adaptability and ability to grow and face challenges.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the underlying software for some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Horizen Network, is informally or formally managed or developed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s or protocol’s source code. Core developers’ roles may evolve over time, generally based on self-determined participation. If athe significantHorizen majority of users and minersDAO were to adopt amendments to the Horizen Network based on the proposals of such core developers, the Horizen Network would be subject to new source code that may adversely affect the value of ZEN.
In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. For example, in August 2017, the Bitcoin Network was upgraded with a technical feature known as “Segregated Witness” that potentially doubles the transactions per second that can be handled on-chain. More importantly, Segregated Witness also enables so-called second layer solutions, such as the Lightning Network, or payment channels that greatly increase transaction throughput (i.e., millions of transactions per second). Wallets and “intermediaries,” or connecting nodes that facilitate payment channels, that support Segregated Witness or Lightning Network-like technologies have not seen wide-scale use as of September 30, 2024. Additionally, questions remain regarding Lightning Network services, such as its cost and who will serve as intermediaries.
As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average transaction fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Bitcoin Network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. Since January 1, 2021,2022, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.38 per transaction on September 8, 2024, to as high as $124.17 per transactiontransaction, on April 20, 2024. As of September 30, 2024,2025, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees stood at $0.79$0.65 per Bitcoin transaction. Increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ZEN (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ZEN, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.
Smart contracts are a new technology and ongoing development may magnify initial problems, cause volatility on the networks that use smart contracts and reduce interest in them, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ZEN.
Smart contracts are programs that run on a blockchain that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Since smart contracts typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in their programming can have damaging effects. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of Ether from The DAO’s accounts into a segregated account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain developers and core contributors pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum Network in order to erase any record of the theft. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a $30 million theft of Ether, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software led to roughly $160 million worth of Ether being indefinitely frozen in an account. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and DeFi protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Initial problems and continued problems with the development, design and deployment of smart contracts, including problems affecting smart contracts linking the Ethereum Network to the Base Network, linking the Horizen Network to the Base Network, or that utilize functionalities provided by the Horizen protocol may have an adverse effect on the value of ZEN, which could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares.
The Horizen protocol and its underlying technologies were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ZEN and an investment in the Shares.
Layer-2 networks, such as the Base Network, serve to overcome certain perceived hurdles associated with the Ethereum Network. Layer-2 blockchains attempt to process transactions through sequencer nodes and then periodically sync to the Ethereum Network according to a set of cryptographic rules that allow all of the transactions that occur on the Layer-2 blockchain to appear as a single transaction on the Ethereum Network. To achieve these scaling goals, the design of the Base Network is centered around the “Optimism Stack,” an open-source software architecture. The Optimism Stack utilizes “optimistic rollups,” a mechanism by which Layer-2 sequencers process users’ transactions and then batches those transactions into a single transaction that “rolls up” to the Ethereum Network. Rather than validating every single transaction like the Ethereum Network, optimistic rollups assume that transactions are valid unless challenged by a validator during a dispute period by submitting a mathematical proof of the invalid transactions. If there are no challenges during a dispute period applicable to a batch of transactions, those transactions are finalized to the Ethereum Network and cannot be undone without manipulating the Ethereum Network against protocol rules. Layer-2 blockchains using the Optimism Stack, such as the Base Network, utilize a “sequencer” that batches and orders Layer-2 transactions to be rolled up to the Ethereum Network, which also allows users to more easily transfer digital assets and data between an Optimism Layer-2 blockchain and the Ethereum Network at a relatively lower cost.
While the Optimism Stack is utilized by one Layer-2 blockchain known as “Optimism Mainnet,” any Layer-2 blockchain can use its open-source software architecture. Layer-2 blockchains that utilize the Optimism Stack have the option to join the Optimism “Superchain,” a collaborative network that includes Optimism Mainnet as well as other Layer-2 blockchains such as the Base Network as well as others like World Chain and Fraxtal. Users of Superchain Layer-2 blockchains can more easily transmit assets, operations, and communications across other Superchain Layer-2 blockchains than what can be achieved across other blockchain systems or non-Superchain Layer-2 blockchains.
The Optimism Stack, optimistic rollups, sequencers, and the Superchain are new blockchain technologies that are not widely used. The Optimism Stack, optimistic rollups, sequencers, and the Superchain may not function as intended. For example, programming errors and failures to implement the Optimism Stack according to specifications could cause communications and interoperability between Optimism Layer-2 networks to fail or could cause liquidity fragmentation among Optimism Layer-2 blockchains, which could hinder the Base Network from achieving its scaling goals.
Further, sequencers may fail to properly batch transactions for inclusion on Ethereum Network. This risk may be heightened for Layer-2 blockchains with centralized sequencers, such as is currently the case for the Base Network, since a centralized sequencer represents a single-point of failure that may be manipulated or may fail without other sequencers able to perform its function as a failsafe. In one example from February 2024, the sequencer processing transactions for the Optimism Mainnet suffered an “unsafe head stall” that prevented it from publishing transactions to the Ethereum Network for over one hour. Users could only manually transfer digital assets between the Optimism Mainnet and the Ethereum Network, inhibiting efficiency and ease-of-use of the Layer-2 blockchain, until a fix was deployed. On the other hand, decentralized sequencers may also represent their own unique risks if the mechanism that assigns duties to the participant nodes fails to perform as intended for any reason.
There are also risks around the optimistic rollup mechanism that allows Layer-2 networks to synchronize with the Ethereum Network via optimistic rollups. For example, the game theory architecture underlying the dispute mechanism may prove faulty, either allowing invalid transactions to unintentionally be processed or preventing valid transactions from successful processing. Risk of failure of the Optimism Stack, such as those affecting optimistic rollups, may affect any or all Layer-2 networks that use the Optimistic Stack or may be isolated to a specific Layer-2 network.
Despite most Layer-2 blockchains’ goals of relieving throughput concerns associated with the Ethereum Network, there are also risks that throughput congestion on the Ethereum Network may nonetheless affect the Base Network because Base Network components must still rely on the Ethereum Network to operate. If the Ethereum Network experiences severe throughput congestion despite the existence of Layer-2 solutions such as the Base Network, transaction fees associated with synchronization between the Base Network and the Ethereum Network may drastically increase, which may render the use of either prohibitively expensive for users.
Because the Horizen protocol operates as a Layer-3 network on the Base Network, it inherits many of these risks. The first iterations of the Horizen protocol were launched in 2025. The Horizen Network may also fail to attract a significant number of users. In addition, there may be flaws in the cryptography underlying the Horizen protocol, including flaws that affect functionality of the Horizen Network or make the network vulnerable to attack. The development of the Horizen Network is ongoing and any further disruption could have a material adverse effect on the value of ZEN and an investment in the Shares.
There is significant uncertainty around the EON 2.0 Migration, and it is possible that developments related to the EON 2.0 Migration may adversely impact the operations of the Trust or the value of the Shares.
In June 2024, members of the ZEN ecosystem voted to deprecate the Horizen Network in favor of the yet-to-be-launched “EON 2.0” network. The EON 2.0 network is intended be a smart contract platform, unlike the Horizen Network, which is primarily intended as a payment platform. Just as in the Horizen Network, ZEN is intended to serve as the native digital asset for EON 2.0. The Horizen Network is expected to be deprecated in favor of EON 2.0 in 2025 and holders of ZEN on the Horizen Network are expected to be able to claim an equal amount of ZEN on the EON 2.0 network around that time. The specific mechanism for holders of ZEN to claim the token on the EON 2.0 network is still under development, and it is currently uncertain how such functionality will ultimately be made available. While the Sponsor is monitoring these and other developments related to the EON 2.0 Migration, it is possible that it will prove operationally difficult or impossible to claim the Trust’s ZEN on the EON 2.0 network in the event of a successful EON 2.0 Migration. If the Horizen Network is deprecated before the Sponsor can claim the Trust’s ZEN on the EON 2.0 network, this could result in a partial or total loss of the Trust’s ZEN. Furthermore, if the Custodian is not able to custody the Trust’s ZEN on the EON 2.0 network, the Sponsor may need to find a replacement custodian. If the Sponsor is not able to promptly find a suitable replacement custodian, the Sponsor may decide to liquidate the Trust. In this way, the EON 2.0 Migration, even if successful, could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ZEN and to the operations of the Trust and may adversely affect the value of the Shares.
It is also possible that the EON 2.0 Migration encounters foreseeable or unforeseeable challenges in its implementation. For example, the EON 2.0 network may experience failures or outages after its launch that cause the network to become unstable or unusable. In such a circumstance, users may decide to cease using the new network, which may adversely affect the market price of ZEN and the value of the Shares.
Further, it is possible that the actual implementation of EON 2.0 and migration from the Horizen Network, including but not limited to the changes to the issuance schedule of new ZEN, may occur differently than is currently expected or possibly not occur at all. It is possible that even if the EON 2.0 Migration is successful, deviations from the previously stated plan may cause reputational damage to ZEN or it contributors, which may discourage users’ usage of the Horizen Network or the EON 2.0 network. This may adversely affect the market price of ZEN and the value of the Shares.
Finally, it is possible that miners on the Horizen Network will continue to sustain the Horizen Network even after the EON 2.0 Migration, possibly resulting in a fork if blocks for both the Horizen Network and EON 2.0 network continue to be processed. For a discussion of how a fork may adversely affect the market price of ZEN and the value of the Shares, see “—A temporary or permanent “fork” or a “clone” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.” For a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding U.S. federal income tax consequences of a fork, see “—Risk Factors Related to the Regulation of Digital Assets, the Trust and the Shares—The treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain.”
It is possible that persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant amount of ZEN, even if they individually only hold a small amount, and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Because of the privacy-preserving features of the Horizen Network, it is not possible to determine whether such concentration of ownership of ZEN exists. If there is any such concentration of ownership, large sales or distributions by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of ZEN. Concentrated ownership of ZEN could also enable a limited number of holders to exert disproportionate influence over governance decisions made through the Horizen DAO, including proposals affecting protocol parameters, treasury allocations, or other matters that may materially impact the Horizen ecosystem and the value of ZEN.
If the digital asset award for mining blocks and transaction fees for recording transactions on the Horizen Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize miners, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate mining activities, miners may cease expanding processing power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares.
If the digital asset awards for mining blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Horizen Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize miners, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate mining activities, miners may cease expending processing power to mine blocks and the security of the Horizen Blockchain could be compromised. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:
Over the past several years, digital asset mining operations have evolved from individual users mining with computer processors, graphics processing units and first-generation application specific integrated circuit machines to “professionalized” mining operations using proprietary hardware or sophisticated machines. If the profit margins of digital asset mining operations are not sufficiently high, including due to an increase in electricity costs, digital asset miners are more likely to immediately sell digital assets earned by mining, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price.
A reduction in the processing power expended by miners could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control on the Horizen Network. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Horizen Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Horizen Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Horizen Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.”
Miners have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If miners demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Horizen Blockchain or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Horizen Network, the cost of using ZEN may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to accept ZEN as a means of payment. Miners may demand higher transaction fees for a variety of reasons, including to compensate for reduction in the reward received for validating a block as a result of portions of each block reward going to EON 1.0 nodes (10%), Super Nodes (10%) and the Horizen Blockchain Foundation (20%), or as a result of the halving of ZEN creation every four years in accordance with the Horizen Network protocol.
Alternatively, miners could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Horizen Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Horizen Network. Higher transaction fees resulting from collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Horizen Network, the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares.
To the extent that any miners cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in mined blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Horizen Blockchain until a block is mined by a miner who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the digital asset network.
Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage, or when the cost of electricity as compared to mining, validating, or transaction fees makes conducting its operations uneconomical.
In addition, in response to a double-spend attack in June 2018, the team behind ZEN implemented mitigation procedures to make it more computationally and economically expensive to privately mine blocks and later introduce those blocks to the public Horizen Network as the valid Horizen Blockchain. If miners do not believe the transaction confirmation fees on the Horizen Network are adequate to compensate them for such increased computational difficulty and economic expense, they may demand higher transaction fees or cease recording transactions on the Horizen Network, which could result in a loss of confidence in the digital asset network and/or make it less attractive to users, any of which could have a material adverse effect on the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares of the Trust.
If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power onover the Horizen Network by compromising the centralized sequencer supporting the Base Network, the rollup infrastructure or smart contracts underlying the Base Network, or otherwisethe Ethereum Network itself, or obtains control over the Horizen Network through itsother influence over core developers or otherwise,means, such actor or botnet could manipulate the BlockchainHorizen Network to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.
The Base Network currently relies on a single sequencer operated by Coinbase to order and batch transactions before submitting them to Ethereum for final settlement. If this sequencer were compromised, became unavailable, or were to engage in malicious behavior—such as censoring transactions, reordering transactions for profit, delaying transaction inclusion, or producing invalid rollup data—it could disrupt the Horizen Network’s operations, delay user transactions, or result in the temporary unavailability of ZEN. Similar risks have been identified in other optimistic rollup systems, where centralized sequencers or proposer sets have been shown to possess the ability to withhold data or manipulate transaction ordering. Rollups may be vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks when attackers submit large volumes of data-heavy transactions that congest data-availability capacity, as well as to dispute-game manipulation in which malicious proposers exploit weaknesses in challenge mechanisms to minimize penalties for fraudulent blocks. Any such events on the Base Network could impede its ability to confirm or finalize transactions, including those involving ZEN or the Horizen Network.
In addition, vulnerabilities or unauthorized modifications in the smart contracts deployed on Ethereum that govern the Base Network could also impair the Base Network’s ability to process transactions or post commitments to the Ethereum Network. Although the Base Network does not rely directly on the Ethereum Network’s validator set for consensus, it remains indirectly dependent on Ethereum’s security for settlement and data availability. Accordingly, a successful attack or coordinated control of a significant portion of the Ethereum network’s validating power—such as “33%,” “50%,” or “66%” of the total amount of staked Ether—could disrupt the confirmation or finality of rollup transactions submitted by the Base Network. In such a scenario, transactions on the Horizen Network or for ZEN could be delayed, reverted, or censored until normal operation resumed, which could adversely affect the functionality of the Horizen protocol, the transferability of ZEN, and the value of the Shares.
If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power on the Horizen Network, it may be able to alter the Blockchain on which transactions in ZEN rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet may not be able to generate new digital assets or transactions using such control, it may be able to “double-spend” its own digital assets (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the processing power on the Horizen Network or the ZEN community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Blockchain may not be possible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Horizen Network.
For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic network. The attack resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Any similar attacks on the Horizen Network could negatively impact the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares.
Moreover, certain mining pools have exceeded in the past, and may exceed now or in Horizen’s future, the 50% threshold on the Horizen Network. For example, on June 2, 2018, the Horizen Network was the target of a double-spend attack by an unknown actor that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Horizen Network. The attack was the result of delayed submission of blocks to the Horizen Network. The team behind ZEN has implemented mitigation procedures to significantly increase the difficulty of attacks of this nature by introducing a penalty for delayed block submissions. The result is that it became more computationally and economically expensive to privately mine blocks and later introduce those blocks to the public Horizen Network as the valid Horizen Blockchain. The failure of these or other mitigating steps, or any future attacks on the Horizen Network, could negatively impact the value of ZEN and the value of the Shares of the Trust.
Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A)
Largest changes
“Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year ended September 30, 2025 was ($3,639), which includes a realized loss of ($173) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($3,466). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $8.13 per ZEN as of September 30, 2024, to $7.83 per ZEN as of September 30, 2025. …”see in full comparison
“Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year ended September 30, 2022 was ($34,585), which includes a realized gain of $346 on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($34,931). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $69.53 per ZEN as of September 30, 2021, to $14.10 per ZEN as of September 30, 2022. …”see in full comparison
“As of September 30, 2025, 2024 and 2023, the Principal Market NAV per Share was calculated using the fair value of ZEN based on the price provided by Coinbase, the Digital Asset Trading Platform that the Trust considered its principal market, as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. Prior to February 7, 2024, Principal Market NAV was referred to as NAV and Principal Market NAV per Share was referred to as NAV per Share.”see in full comparison
“As of September 30, 2024, 2023 and 2022, the Principal Market NAV per Share was calculated using the fair value of ZEN based on the price provided by Coinbase, the Digital Asset Trading Platform that the Trust considered its principal market, as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. Prior to February 7, 2024, Principal Market NAV was referred to as NAV and Principal Market NAV per Share was referred to as NAV per Share.”see in full comparison
“As of September 30, 2025, the Trust had a net closing balance with a value of $7,480,865, based on the Reference Rate Price (non-GAAP methodology). As of September 30, 2025, the Trust had a total market value of $7,480,865, based on the Digital Asset Market price of ZEN on the Trust’s principal market (Coinbase).”see in full comparison
“As of September 30, 2022, the Trust had a net closing balance with a value of $8,709,124, based on the Reference Rate Price (non-GAAP methodology). As of September 30, 2022, the Trust had a total market value of $8,690,633, based on the Digital Asset Market price of ZEN on the Trust’s principal market (Coinbase).”see in full comparison
Full comparison: every changed paragraph (18)
The Trust is a passive entity that is managed and administered by the Sponsor and does not have any officers, directors or employees. The Trust holds ZEN and, from time to time on a periodic basis, issues Creation Baskets in exchange for deposits of ZEN. As a passive investment vehicle, the Trust’s investment objective is for the value of the Shares (based on ZEN per Share) to reflect the value of ZEN held by the Trust, determined by reference to the Reference Rate Price, less the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities. While an investment in the Shares is not a direct investment in ZEN, the Shares are designed to provide investors with a cost-effective and convenient way to gain investment exposure to ZEN. To date, the Trust has not met its investment objective and the Shares quoted on OTCQX have not reflected the value of ZEN held by the Trust, less the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities, but instead have traded at both premiums and discounts to such value, which at times have been substantial. The Trust is not managed like a business corporation or an active investment vehicle. On October 7, 2021, the Trust completed a 10-for-1 Share split (the “Share Split”) of the Trust’s issued and outstanding Shares. Each Shareholder of record as of the close of business on October 6, 2021 received 9 additional Shares of the Trust for each Share held. The number of outstanding Shares and per-Share amounts disclosed for all periods prior to October 7, 2021 have been retroactively adjusted to reflect the effects of the Share Split. The Trust is not managed like a business corporation or an active investment vehicle. The Trust will not utilize leverage, derivatives or any similar arrangements in seeking to meet its investment objective.
First, the Trust reviews a list of Digital Asset Markets that maintain practices and policies designed to comply with anti-money laundering (“AML”) and know-your-customer (“KYC”) regulations, and non-Digital Asset Trading Platform Markets that the Trust reasonably believes are operating in compliance with applicable law, including federal and state licensing requirements, based upon information and assurances provided to it by each market.
The cost basis of the ZEN received by the Trust in connection with a creation order is recorded by the Trust at the fair value of ZEN at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the creation date for financial reporting purposes. The cost basis recorded by the Trust may differ from proceeds collected by the Authorized Participant from the sale of the corresponding Shares to investors.
The Trust is an investment company for U.S. GAAP purposes and follows accounting and reporting guidance in accordance with the FASB ASC Topic 946, Financial Services —Investment Companies. The Trust uses fair value as its method of accounting for ZEN in accordance with its classification as an investment company for accounting purposes. The Trust is not a registered investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940.Act. U.S. GAAP requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts in the financial statements and accompanying notes. Actual results could differ from those estimates and these differences could be material.
Financial Highlights for the Years ended September 30, 2024,2025, 20232024 and 20222023 (All amounts in the following table and the subsequent paragraphs, except Share, per Share, ZEN and price of ZEN amounts, are in thousands)
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year ended September 30, 2025 was ($3,639), which includes a realized loss of ($173) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($3,466). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $8.13 per ZEN as of September 30, 2024, to $7.83 per ZEN as of September 30, 2025. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($3,885) for the year ended September 30, 2025, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $246. Net assets increased to $7,481 at September 30, 2025, a 57% increase for the year. The increase in net assets resulted from the contribution of approximately 390,780 ZEN with a value of $6,599 to the Trust in connection with Share creations during the year, partially offset by the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 21,655 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee.
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year ended September 30, 2022 was ($34,585), which includes a realized gain of $346 on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($34,931). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the year was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $69.53 per ZEN as of September 30, 2021, to $14.10 per ZEN as of September 30, 2022. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($35,249) for the year ended September 30, 2022, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $664. Net assets decreased to $8,691 at September 30, 2022, an 80% decrease for the year. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 15,604 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee.
Share and per Share amounts for periods presented prior to the Share Split have been retroactively adjusted for the 10-for-1 Share Split of the Trust’s issued and outstanding Shares completed on October 7, 2021.
As of September 30, 2025, 2024 and 2023, the Principal Market NAV per Share was calculated using the fair value of ZEN based on the price provided by Coinbase, the Digital Asset Trading Platform that the Trust considered its principal market, as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. Prior to February 7, 2024, Principal Market NAV was referred to as NAV and Principal Market NAV per Share was referred to as NAV per Share.
As of September 30, 2024, 2023 and 2022, the Principal Market NAV per Share was calculated using the fair value of ZEN based on the price provided by Coinbase, the Digital Asset Trading Platform that the Trust considered its principal market, as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. Prior to February 7, 2024, Principal Market NAV was referred to as NAV and Principal Market NAV per Share was referred to as NAV per Share.
(4)
The Trust’s NAV per Share is derived from the Reference Rate Price as represented by the Reference Rate as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. The Trust’s NAV per Share is calculated using a non-GAAP methodology where the price is derived from multiple Digital Asset Trading Platforms. Prior to February 7, 2024, NAV was referred to as Digital Asset Holdings and NAV per Share was referred to as Digital Asset Holdings per Share. See “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEN Industry and Market—ZEN Value—The Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price” for a description of the Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price. Effective June 16, 2023, the Reference Rate Provider removed Binance.US from the Reference Rate due to Binance.US’s announcement that the trading platform was suspending U.S. dollar deposits and withdrawals and planned to delist its U.S. dollar trading pairs, and did not add any Constituent Trading Platforms as part of its review. As a result of this removal, there were no longer sufficient Constituent Trading Platforms for the Reference Rate Provider to continue producing the Reference Rate pursuant to the Constituent Trading Platform selection methodology described in “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEN Industry and Market—ZEN Value—The Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price—Constituent Trading Platform Selection.” If the Reference Rate becomes unavailable, the Sponsor employs an alternative method to determine the Reference Rate Price under the cascading set of rules set forth in “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEN Industry and Market—ZEN Value—The Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price—Determination of the Reference Rate Price When Reference Rate Price is Unavailable.” Effective June 20, 2023, CoinDesk Indices, Inc. no longer determines the Reference Rate Price, and the Reference Rate Price is the Secondary Reference Rate Price, which is the price set by Coin Metrics Real-Time Rate as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. The Secondary Reference Rate Price is a real-time reference rate price, calculated using trade data from constituent markets selected by Coin Metrics, Inc., the Secondary Reference Rate Provider. Effective June 20, 2023, any references to the “Reference Rate Price” in this Annual Report refers to the Secondary Reference Rate Price set by the Secondary Reference Rate selected by the Secondary Reference Rate Provider. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate as of September 30, 20242025 were Coinbase, Binance, Bybit, Huobi, MEXC and KuCoin. As of September 30, 2024, the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate consisted of Coinbase, Binance, Bybit, Gate.io and KuCoin. As of September 30, 2023, the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate consisted of Coinbase, Binance, Gate.io and OKX. As of September 30, 2022, the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate consisted of Coinbase, Binance.US and Bittrex.
As of September 30, 2025, the Trust had a net closing balance with a value of $7,480,865, based on the Reference Rate Price (non-GAAP methodology). As of September 30, 2025, the Trust had a total market value of $7,480,865, based on the Digital Asset Market price of ZEN on the Trust’s principal market (Coinbase).
As of September 30, 2022, the Trust had a net closing balance with a value of $8,709,124, based on the Reference Rate Price (non-GAAP methodology). As of September 30, 2022, the Trust had a total market value of $8,690,633, based on the Digital Asset Market price of ZEN on the Trust’s principal market (Coinbase).
The following table sets out the range of high and low closing prices for the Shares as reported by OTCQX, the Trust’s Principal Market NAV per Share calculated in accordance with U.S. GAAP and the Trust’s NAV per Share for each of the quarters sinceof Octoberthe 19,prior 2021.three years.
HZEN Premium/(Discount): HZEN Share Price vs. NAV per Share (Non-GAAP) ($) (1)
HZEN Premium/(Discount): HZEN Share Price vs. NAV per Share (Non-GAAP) (%) (1)
Effective June 20, 2023, any references to the “Reference Rate Price” in this Annual Report refers to the Secondary Reference Rate Price set by the Secondary Reference Rate selected by the Secondary Reference Rate Provider.
What changed in the latest 10-Q
Risk Factors
There have been no material changes to the Risk Factors last reported under “Part I, Item 1A. Risk Factors” of our Transition Report.
No wording changes found in this section.
Full comparison: every changed paragraph (0)
Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A)
Largest changes
“Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the six months ended June 30, 2025 was ($19,505), which includes a realized loss of ($82) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($19,423). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $28.91 per ZEN as of December 31, 2024, to $7.38 per ZEN as of June 30, 2025. …”see in full comparison
“Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the six months ended June 30, 2026 was ($4,821), which includes a realized loss of ($148) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($4,673). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $9.14 per ZEN as of December 31, 2025, to $4.03 per ZEN as of June 30, 2026. …”see in full comparison
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the three months endedsee in full comparisonMarchJune31,30, 2025 was ($18,139$1,366), which includes a realized loss of ($21$61) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($18,118$1,305). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from$28.91 per ZEN as of December 31, 2024, to$8.81 per ZEN as of March 31, 2025, to $7.38 per ZEN as of June 30, 2025. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($18,229$1,418) for the three months endedMarchJune31,30, 2025, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of$90.$52. Net assets decreased to$8,408$7,096 atMarchJune31,30, 2025, a67%16% decrease for the three-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately5,6636,007 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee, partially offset by the contribution of approximately70,65813,062 ZEN with a value of$924$106 to the Trust in connection with Share creations during the period.
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the three months endedsee in full comparisonMarchJune31,30, 2026 was ($3,321$1,500), which includes a realized loss of ($69$79) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($3,252$1,421). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from$9.14 per ZEN as of December 31, 2025, to$5.63 per ZEN as of March 31, 2026, to $4.03 per ZEN as of June 30, 2026. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($3,363$1,532) for the three months endedMarchJune31,30, 2026, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of$42.$32. Net assets decreased to$5,310$3,778 atMarchJune31,30, 2026, a39%29% decrease for the three-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately5,8355,863 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee.
Full comparison: every changed paragraph (12)
The Trust is a passive entity that is managed and administered by the Sponsor and does not have any officers, directors or employees. The Trust holds ZEN and, from time to time on a periodic basis, issues Creation Baskets in exchange for deposits of ZEN. As a passive investment vehicle, the Trust’s investment objective is for the value of the Shares (based on ZEN per Share) to reflect the value of the ZEN held by the Trust, determined by reference to the Reference Rate Price, less the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities. While an investment in the Shares is not a direct investment in ZEN, the Shares are designed to provide investors with a cost-effective and convenient way to gain investment exposure to ZEN. To date, the Trust has not met its investment objective and the Shares quoted on OTCQXOTC Markets have not reflected the value of the ZEN held by the Trust, less the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities, but instead have traded at both premiums and discounts to such value, which at times have been substantial. The Trust is not managed like a business corporation or an active investment vehicle. The Trust will not utilize leverage, derivatives or any similar arrangements in seeking to meet its investment objective.
Financial Highlights for the Three and Six Months Ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026 and 2025 (All amounts in the following table and the subsequent paragraphs, except Share, ZEN and price of ZEN amounts, are in thousands)
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the three months ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026 was ($3,321$1,500), which includes a realized loss of ($69$79) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($3,252$1,421). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $9.14 per ZEN as of December 31, 2025, to $5.63 per ZEN as of March 31, 2026, to $4.03 per ZEN as of June 30, 2026. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($3,363$1,532) for the three months ended MarchJune 31,30, 2026, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $42.$32. Net assets decreased to $5,310$3,778 at MarchJune 31,30, 2026, a 39%29% decrease for the three-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 5,8355,863 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee.
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the three months ended MarchJune 31,30, 2025 was ($18,139$1,366), which includes a realized loss of ($21$61) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($18,118$1,305). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $28.91 per ZEN as of December 31, 2024, to $8.81 per ZEN as of March 31, 2025, to $7.38 per ZEN as of June 30, 2025. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($18,229$1,418) for the three months ended MarchJune 31,30, 2025, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $90.$52. Net assets decreased to $8,408$7,096 at MarchJune 31,30, 2025, a 67%16% decrease for the three-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 5,6636,007 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee, partially offset by the contribution of approximately 70,65813,062 ZEN with a value of $924$106 to the Trust in connection with Share creations during the period.
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the six months ended June 30, 2026 was ($4,821), which includes a realized loss of ($148) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($4,673). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $9.14 per ZEN as of December 31, 2025, to $4.03 per ZEN as of June 30, 2026. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($4,895) for the six months ended June 30, 2026, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $74. Net assets decreased to $3,778 at June 30, 2026, a 56% decrease for the six-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 11,698 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee.
Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the six months ended June 30, 2025 was ($19,505), which includes a realized loss of ($82) on the transfer of ZEN to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on investment in ZEN of ($19,423). Net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN for the period was driven by ZEN price depreciation from $28.91 per ZEN as of December 31, 2024, to $7.38 per ZEN as of June 30, 2025. Net decrease in net assets resulting from operations was ($19,647) for the six months ended June 30, 2025, which consisted of the net realized and unrealized loss on investment in ZEN, plus the Sponsor’s Fee of $142. Net assets decreased to $7,096 at June 30, 2025, a 72% decrease for the six-month period. The decrease in net assets resulted from the aforementioned ZEN price depreciation and the withdrawal of approximately 11,671 ZEN to pay the foregoing Sponsor’s Fee, partially offset by the contribution of approximately 83,720 ZEN with a value of $1,030 to the Trust in connection with Share creations during the period.
The Trust’s NAV and NAV per Share are derived from the Reference Rate Price, as represented by the Reference Rate as of 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the valuation date. The Trust’s NAV per Share is calculated using a non-GAAP methodology where the price is derived from multiple Digital Asset Trading Platforms. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate (the “Constituent Trading Platforms”) as of MarchJune 31,30, 2026 were Coinbase, Binance, ByBit, and OKX. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Reference Rate as of MarchJune 31,30, 2025 were Coinbase, Binance, ByBit, KuCoin, Huobi and MEXC. See “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEN Industry and Market—ZEN Value—The Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price” in our Transition Report for a description of the Reference Rate and Reference Rate Price.
The following chart illustrates the movement in the Trust’s NAV per Share versus the Reference Rate Price and the Trust’s Principal Market NAV per Share from August 6, 2018 (the inception of the Trust’s operations) to MarchJune 31,30, 2026. For more information on the determination of the Trust’s NAV, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEN Industry and Market—ZEN Value—The Reference Rate and the Reference Rate Price” in our Transition Report.
The following table illustrates the movements in the Reference Rate Price from AprilJuly 1, 2021 to MarchJune 31,30, 2026. The Sponsor has not observed a material difference between the Reference Rate Price and average prices from the Constituent Trading Platforms individually or as a group.
The following table illustrates the movements in the Digital Asset Market price of ZEN, as reported on the Trust’s principal market, from AprilJuly 1, 2021 to MarchJune 31,30, 2026.
The following chart sets out the historical closing prices for the Shares as reported by OTCQXOTC Markets and the Trust’s NAV per Share from October 19, 2021 to MarchJune 31,30, 2026.
The following chart sets out the historical premium and discount for the Shares calculated as a percentage of the historical closing prices for the Shares as reported by OTCQXOTC Markets divided by the Trust’s NAV per Share from October 19, 2021 to MarchJune 31,30, 2026.
HZEN insider buying and selling (Form 4)
Since 2026-04-11, insiders reported open-market purchases in 0 Form 4 filings and open-market sales in 0 filings. Totals add up every open-market (code P and S) line in those filings, using the prices reported in the filings. Awards, option exercises, tax withholding and gifts are listed below but not counted.
No Form 4 stock transactions in this period.
Well-known investors holding HZEN (13F)
None of the 59 investors we track reported a position in their latest 13F.